A Digital Cry for Help: Internet Radio’s Struggle to Survive a Second Royalty Rate Determination Under the Willing Buyer/Willing Seller Standard by Flavin, Brian
Saint Louis University Public Law Review 
Volume 27 
Number 2 Elections in the Information Age: 
Making Your Money and Your Vote Count 
(Volume XXVII, No. 2) 
Article 9 
2008 
A Digital Cry for Help: Internet Radio’s Struggle to Survive a 
Second Royalty Rate Determination Under the Willing Buyer/
Willing Seller Standard 
Brian Flavin 
briflav@aol.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/plr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Flavin, Brian (2008) "A Digital Cry for Help: Internet Radio’s Struggle to Survive a Second Royalty Rate 
Determination Under the Willing Buyer/Willing Seller Standard," Saint Louis University Public Law Review: 
Vol. 27 : No. 2 , Article 9. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/plr/vol27/iss2/9 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Saint Louis University Public Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more 
information, please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
427 
A DIGITAL CRY FOR HELP: INTERNET RADIO’S STRUGGLE TO 
SURVIVE A SECOND ROYALTY RATE DETERMINATION UNDER 
THE WILLING BUYER/WILLING SELLER STANDARD 
RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On March 2, 2007, the Copyright Royalty Board (“CRB”) significantly 
increased the royalty rates that Internet radio webcasters pay under § 114 of the 
Copyright Act to digitally broadcast sound recordings over the Internet.1  The 
new rates apply retroactively from the period of January 1, 2006 to December 
31, 2010.2  The only prior determination of such royalty rates was made in 
2002 by the Librarian of Congress upon recommendation from a Copyright 
Royalty Arbitration Panel (“CARP”).3  In making each of these rate 
determinations, the regulatory body charged with setting new rates was 
required to employ the willing buyer/willing seller standard—one of various 
amendments to the Copyright Act of 1976 introduced by the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (“DMCA”).4  Not only is this standard 
flawed because it ignores traditional notions of copyright law, but the 
particular way in which it has been interpreted and applied has produced 
successively controversial royalty rates that many webcasters claim threaten to 
drive them out of business.  At stake in this controversy is the future of Internet 
radio.  If the fears of small and noncommercial webcasters are fully realized 
and they are driven out of business by excessive royalty rates, then the 
diversity that makes Internet radio an attractive alternative to today’s 
homogenized AM/FM radio will likewise disappear.  Accordingly, Congress 
 
 1. See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 72 Fed. 
Reg. 24,084, 24,096 (May 1, 2007) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380) [hereinafter CRB 
Determination]; 17 U.S.C. § 114 (West Supp. 2006).  Note that in addition to setting rates for the 
digital transmission of sound recordings, the CRB also set rates for the making of ephemeral 
copies of sound recordings (often necessary for webcasting).  This Recent Development will not 
address the details of CRB’s ruling on this related, but separate issue. 
 2. CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,084. 
 3. See Determination of Reasonable Rates and Terms for the Digital Performance of Sound 
Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,240 (July 8, 2002) (codified at 37 CFR 
pt. 261) [hereinafter CARP Determination]. 
 4. See id. at 45,243; CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,087. 
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must address the shortcomings of the willing buyer/willing seller standard 
before the current licensing period ends in 2010.  Otherwise, the battle over 
webcaster royalty rates will become a cyclical problem that prevents copyright 
owners, webcasters, and the public from realizing the full potential of Internet 
radio. 
This Recent Development discusses the state of Internet radio in light of 
the CRB’s 2007 rate determination under the willing buyer/willing seller 
standard.  Retroactive royalties, dating back to January 1, 2006, have been due 
to SoundExchange since July 15, 2007.5  However, the controversy is far from 
resolved.  Part II of this article provides brief histories of Internet radio and 
federal protection of sound recordings.  Part III addresses the 2002 and 2007 
royalty-rate determinations, with particular emphasis on the latter decision.  
Part IV considers various criticisms of the current rate determination process, 
including claims that the willing buyer/willing seller standard is flawed and 
that the process is technologically biased against Internet radio.  Part V 
analyzes the different relief efforts currently being pursued by webcasters, 
including (1) an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit, (2) proposed legislation in the form of the Internet Radio 
Equality Act (“IREA”) and the Performance Rights Act, respectively, (3) 
direct negotiation with SoundExchange, and (4) relocating webcasting 
operations abroad.  Finally, Part VI concludes that the passage of legislation 
like the IREA and the Performance Rights Act are necessary steps toward a 
long-term solution to the present royalty rate controversy. 
II.  RELEVANT HISTORIES 
A. Internet Radio 
Internet radio first garnered national media attention in 1993 when Internet 
Talk Radio began broadcasting its weekly half-hour radio programs over the 
Internet.6  At the time, the notion of unsophisticated Internet-users creating 
their own Internet radio programs was still just that: a notion.7  Over the next 
 
 5. Paul Maloney, Webcasters get breathing room; CRB pushes D-day to July 15th, RAIN, 
May 2, 2007, http://www.kurthanson.com/archive/news/050207/index.shtml.  See 
SoundExchange, Statement on Final Determination of Copyright Royalty Board on Webcasting 
Royalty Rates, May 1, 2007, http://soundexchange.com (follow “News” hyperlink). 
 6. John Markoff, Turning the Desktop PC Into Talk Radio Medium, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 
1993, at A1.  See also MuseumMedia.org, http://museum.media.org/radio (last visited last visited 
Feb. 11, 2008). 
 7. Markoff, supra note 6, at D18 (“Conceivably, any Internet user could create his own 
audio or video program and and [sic] make it available on the network, just as the creator of 
Internet Talk Radio plans.”)  (emphasis added). 
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decade and a half, advancements in technology and user accessibility turned 
many Internet hopes and dreams of the early 1990s into reality.8 
Since those early days, Internet radio has become an increasingly popular 
alternative to traditional, “terrestrial radio.”9  Commonly referred to as 
webcasting, Internet radio broadcasts are typically accomplished in one of two 
ways, both of which involve the non-interactive,10 continuous transmission of 
digital content over the Internet using “streaming media technology.”11  The 
distinction to be made is between Internet-only webcasting and simulcasting.12  
The former involves broadcasting content solely over the Internet; the latter 
involves broadcasting the same content contemporaneously over the Internet 
and over terrestrial radio waves.13  Both types of webcasting are currently 
subject to the § 114 statutory royalty rates addressed in this Recent 
Development.14 
Internet radio is currently the fastest-growing medium in radio.  Bridge 
Ratings, a radio market analysis firm in Glendale, California, estimates that 
57.6 million listeners tuned in to Internet radio each week in 2006.15  With a 
 
 8. See Alex Cosper, The History of Internet Radio (2007), http://www.tangentsunset.com/ 
internetradio.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2008). 
 9. Id.  “Terrestrial radio” is common jargon for traditional, over-the-air AM/FM radio, 
which is transmitted using land-based technology. Jason A. Auerbach, Note, Recording Satellite 
Radio—Adapting to Modern Technology or Infringing Copyright, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 331, 333 
(2007). 
 10. This article is generally concerned only with non-interactive Internet radio webcasting 
services.  Interactive webcasting services, which allow users to control certain aspects of a 
station’s programming, are also subject to § 114 performance royalties.  See 17 U.S.C. § 114 
(West 2006). 
 11. ROBERT L. HILLIARD & MICHAEL C. KEITH, THE QUIETED VOICE: THE RISE AND 
DEMISE OF LOCALISM IN AMERICAN RADIO 177 (2005). 
Streaming media technology enables the real time or on demand distribution of audio, 
video and multimedia on the internet [sic]. Streaming media is the simultaneous transfer 
of digital media (video, voice and data) so that it is received as a continuous real-time 
stream. Stream data is transmitted by a server application and received and displayed in 
real-time by client applications. These applications can start displaying video or playing 
back audio as soon as enough data has been received and stored in the receiving station’s 
buffer. A streamed file is simultaneously downloaded and viewed, but leaves behind no 
physical file on the viewer’s machine. 
StreamingMedia.com, Streaming Media, http://www.streamingmedia.com/glossary/term.asp?t= 
streaming%20media (last visited Mar. 21, 2008). 
 12. HILLIARD & KEITH, supra note 11, at 177. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 15. Bridge Ratings, Digital Media Growth Projections, http://www.bridgeratings.com/press_ 
08,15,07-digitalprojectionsupd.htm (comparing Internet, satellite, HD, and terrestrial radio).  The 
Bridge Ratings’ sample consisted of 4,541 people, twelve years of age and up, randomly 
interviewed by telephone or in person at the mall, between May and July of 2007. Id.  See also 
Shaun Assael, Online and on the Edge, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23 2007, at 32. 
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projected annual listener growth rate of twenty-seven percent, Internet radio 
could have 147.5 million weekly listeners by 2010 and more than 196 million 
listeners by 2020.16  While terrestrial radio still dominates the radio market, 
averaging roughly 280 million weekly listeners in 2006, its projected annual 
listener growth rate is only one percent through 2020.17  Comparative 
projections like these have some in the business saying that Internet radio is 
terrestrial radio’s “biggest threat.”18 
Crucial to Internet radio’s success is a growing feeling that “[Terrestrial] 
radio has lost its ability to engage the listener in a music experience”19—a 
phenomenon often attributed to a lack of variety in modern commercial 
programming.  In large part, terrestrial radio’s current homogeneity can be 
traced back to the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“Telecom Act”).20  The 
Telecom Act effectively eliminated caps on national radio station ownership 
while raising caps on local station ownership.21  Thus, the Telecom Act 
essentially encouraged the “unlimited national consolidation” of radio 
ownership.22  According to a 2006 study, the extensive consolidation of 
ownership that ensued over the following decade produced, among other 
things, fewer radio companies, larger radio companies with increased revenue 
and ratings concentrations, declining local ownership, concentrated network 
ownership, and, ultimately, homogenized programming with fewer listeners.23  
The same study found that “[j]ust fifteen formats make up 76% of commercial 
programming,” and that “[r]adio formats with different names can overlap up 
to 80% in terms of the songs played . . . .”24  This lack of variety has some 
 
 16. Bridge Ratings, Digital Media Growth Projections, http://www.bridgeratings.com/press_ 
08,15,07-digitalprojectionsupd.htm. 
 17. Id. 
 18. HILLIARD & KEITH, supra note 11, at 178 (quoting David Porter of Live365); cf. Assael, 
supra note 15, at 32 (stating that webcasters are spurring a new golden age in radio). 
 19. HILLIARD & KEITH, supra note 11, at 178. 
 20. See DANIEL CASTRO, SENIOR ANALYST, THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & 
INNOVATION FOUNDATION, INTERNET RADIO AND COPYRIGHT ROYALTIES: REFORMING A 
BROKEN SYSTEM (May 2007), http://www.itif.org/files/InternetRadio.pdf; PETER DICOLA, FALSE 
PREMISES, FALSE PROMISES: A QUANTITATIVE HISTORY OF OWNERSHIP CONSOLIDATION IN 
THE RADIO INDUSTRY (2006), http://www.futureofmusic.org/images/FMCradiostudy06exec 
sum.pdf (on file with author).  See generally Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
104, 10 Stat. 56 (1996). 
 21. DICOLA, supra note 20, at 1–2. 
 22. Id.  See also CASTRO, supra note 20, at 2 (“[B]etween 1996 and 2002 Clear Channel 
Communications grew from 40 stations to 1,240 stations.”). 
 23. DICOLA, supra note 20, at 2–4. 
 24. Id. at 4. 
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critics saying that “the number one threat [to terrestrial radio] is crappy music; 
it’s not technology.”25 
In contrast, many listeners are drawn to Internet radio specifically for its 
variety in programming.26  As a medium, Internet radio currently promotes 
diverse programming in several ways.  First, it is significantly easier to start up 
an Internet radio station than a traditional radio station.27  As a result, not only 
do current webcasting ranks include “titans” such as AOL and Yahoo!, but also 
NPR, college radio stations, religious and community-based broadcasters, and 
hobbyists who broadcast from homes and workplaces.28  Second, unlike 
terrestrial radio, Internet radio is not limited by the number of channels it can 
make available to listeners.29  Third, Internet radio’s digital reach is far 
superior to that of terrestrial radio, which is intrinsically restricted by the finite 
reach of traditional analog radio waves.30  The diversity of Internet radio 
programming has even garnered the attention of Congress.31  To summarize 
Internet radio’s appeal: 
Internet radio explodes the boundaries of radio broadcasting, opening up a 
universe of stations offering far more diversity than what is available on the 
 
 25. HILLIARD & KEITH, supra note 11, at 178 (quoting Jay Frank of Yahoo’s Internet radio 
station, Launch). 
 26. See Allison Kidd, Recent Developments, Mending the Tear in the Internet Radio 
Community: A Call for a Legislative Band-Aid, 4 N.C.  J. L. & TECH. 339, 344 n.32 (2003) 
(noting survey results indicating that the number one reason listeners tuned-in to Internet radio 
was that “it provides audio content you cannot get otherwise” (quoting JOAN FITZGERALD & 
LARRY ROSIN, RADIO AND E-COMMERCE: THE ARBITRON INTERNET LISTENING STUDY II 23 
(1999), http://www.arbitron.com/downloads/E-Commerce.pdf)). 
 27. Entrance into the terrestrial radio market has traditionally been heavily regulated by the 
communications industry.  See generally DiCola, supra note 20.  This is not so for Internet radio.  
For example, one online guide to starting your own Internet radio station claims that you can start 
a “legal [I]nternet radio station for less than $40,” assuming you have a computer that is “3 years 
old or newer” and a broadband Internet connection.  ILikeTunes.com, Building Your Dream: 
How to Start an Internet Radio Station, http://www.iliketunes.com/stationguide.asp (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2008). 
 28. Assael, supra note 15, at 32.  See CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,084–86. 
 29. See, e.g., Elliot Van Buskirk, Royalty Hike Panics Webcasters, WIRED MAGAZINE, Mar. 
6, 2007, available at http://www.wired.com/entertainment/music/news/2007/03/72879 (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2007) (“Larger services that offer thousands of channels, such as the free Pandora, 
are also facing a huge spike in royalty costs.”) (emphasis added). 
 30. See, e.g., Peter Passell, Coast-to-Coast Radio Without Squawk or Fade, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 27, 1994, at F8 (explaining that “signals from [radio] transmission towers will always have 
limited range.”).  Similar to Internet radio, HD and satellite radio also offer a stronger and clearer 
reception than traditional analog radio.  See Glenn Fleishman, Revolution on the Radio, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 28, 2005, at C11. 
 31. See Kidd, supra note 26, at 363 n.148 (“This lower payment schedule will ensure that 
Internet radio continues to offer consumers a nearly endless number of listening choices . . .”) 
(quoting Rep. Karen McCarthy, 148 Cong. Rec. 19,283 (2002)). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
432 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVII:427 
traditional radio dial.  Once you start listening to Internet radio, the limits of 
AM and FM—a limited number of stations, within a limited geographical 
area—seem like a throwback to another era.  Net radio provides possibilities 
for listening well beyond the advertising-soaked sameness of the commercial 
stations available.32 
Internet radio’s success has not gone unnoticed.  Advertisers have certainly 
started to follow listeners to Internet radio.  In fact, Bridge Ratings projects 
that advertising revenue from Internet radio may even surpass that of 
traditional radio in 2008 and will continue to increase as Internet radio attracts 
more listeners.33  Moreover, the recording industry has taken notice of Internet 
radio’s success.  After suffering years of declining record sales, the industry 
has recently put more and more pressure on Congress to strengthen federal 
protection of sound recording in order to realize Internet radio’s potentially 
lucrative and previously untapped revenue stream.34  Unfortunately, recent 
increases in federal protection of sound recordings—particularly as reflected 
by the current royalty system—threaten the very diversity that has made 
Internet radio a successful alternative to terrestrial radio.35 
 
 32. HILLIARD & KEITH, supra note 11, at 178 (quoting critic Allan Hoffman). 
 33. Bridge Ratings, HD vs. Internet Radio (Aug. 8, 2007), http://www.bridgeratings.com/ 
press_08.08.07.HDvs Internet.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2007).  Unfortunately, increased ad 
revenue alone has not proven sufficient to counterbalance or fully account for recent increases in 
royalty rates.  In fact, since the latest rates became effective, many webcasters have either been 
forced to shut down or cut back on the number of music streams offered to the public, or even 
restrict the number of listeners able to tune-in to the station at a given time.  Hiawatha Bray, 
Internet Radio Firms Say Royalties Limiting Choices, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 14, 2008, at C1.  
If increased ad revenue sufficiently accounted for increased royalty costs, webcasters would be 
adding listening streams and trying to attract more listeners rather than decreasing those amounts, 
given that an advertiser’s willingness to pay is directly tied to the number of consumers its 
advertising reaches. 
 34. See, e.g., Assael, supra note 15, at 32 (“If our artists aren’t making money from CD 
sales, we think they should make money from [all Internet radio broadcasts].” (quoting John 
Simson, Executive Director of SoundExchange)); All Access Music Group, Exclusive: 
SoundExchange’s Simson Ties Royalty to New Artist Airplay, Nov. 19, 2007, (on file with author) 
available at http://www.allaccess.com/site/features/index.php?bs=sk&sn=interviews&f=%3C 
span%20class= simson&ag=172 (“What you have to recognize is that radio play can be substitute 
[sic] for CD sales.” (quoting John Simson, Executive Director of SoundExchange)). Since the 
recording industry is targeting Internet radio as a way to make up lost record sales, should it not 
also be targeting terrestrial and satellite radio and trying to get those media outlets to pay 
equivalent digital performance royalties?  Is not the only significant difference between these 
types of radio the medium over which content is broadcast?  This Recent Development suggests 
that, in fact, medium is the only relevant difference between terrestrial, Internet, and satellite 
radio, and that this distinction is insufficient to justify the disparate treatment of broadcasters 
concerning royalty rates. 
 35. Bray, supra note 33, at C5 (“Critics of the royalty system say the result [of increased 
royalties] is decreasing musical diversity on the Internet . . . ‘Your Internet radio is going to 
sound like your AM and FM.’”) (quoting Johnie Floater, general manager of media for Live365). 
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B. Federal Protection of Sound Recordings 
Section 102 of the Copyright Act of 1976 extends federal copyright 
protection to eight types of works, including “musical works” and “sound 
recordings.”36  A musical work consists of the underlying notes and lyrics of a 
song, while a sound recording results from the specific fixation or recording of 
a song.37  Thus, one musical work may have multiple sound recordings, 
depending on the number of times the work is recorded.38 
Historically, federal copyright law has granted copyright owners of 
musical works the exclusive right to publicly perform their works.39  The same 
cannot be said for owners of sound recordings, who did not even enjoy federal 
copyright protection until 1971, when Congress passed the Sound Recording 
Amendment (“SRA”) in an attempt to fight the growing threat of recording 
piracy.40  While the SRA granted owners of sound recordings provisional 
rights to reproduce and distribute their sound recordings—rights that became 
permanent under the Copyright Act of 197641—it did not grant them the public 
performance right they had been lobbying for since the 1920s.42  It would be 
1995 before Congress finally granted sound recording owners (part of) what 
they had been asking for. 
1. The DPRA 
In 1995, Congress enacted the Digital Performance Right in Sound 
Recordings Act (“DPRA”).43  The DPRA extended federal copyright 
protection of sound recordings by adding § 106(6) to the Copyright Act of 
 
 36. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102 (West 2006). 
 37. See, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2004); CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,086 (May 1, 
2007) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380). 
 38. CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086. 
 39. The public performance right for musical compositions dates back to the year 1856.  
WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, § 14:3, at 14-7, § 14:4, at 14-8 (2007) (explaining 
that “[t]he 1909 [Copyright] Act continued the 1856 public performance right for dramatic works 
and musical compositions”). 
 40. Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters (Bonneville Two), 347 F.3d 485, 487 (3rd Cir. 2003); 
Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391.  Sound recordings made 
prior to February 17, 1972—the effective date of the SRA—are protectable under common and/or 
state law until February 15, 2047.  U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright Registration for Sound 
Recordings, Circular 56, (2007), available at http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ56.pdf. 
 41. Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters (Bonneville One), 153 F.Supp.2d 763, 766 (E.D. Penn. 
2001), aff’d, 347 F.3d 485 (3rd Cir. 2003).  See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 
Stat. 1873 (1974). 
 42. Bonneville One, 153 F.Supp.2d at 766; PATRY, supra note 39, at §14:29 (explaining that 
after 75 years of lobbying Congress granted sound recording owners a limited public performance 
right). 
 43. See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 
109 Stat. 336 (1995) [hereinafter DPRA]. 
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1976.44  This section granted sound recording owners the limited right to 
publicly perform or authorize the public performance of their sound recordings 
“by means of a digital audio transmission.”45  Congress enacted the DPRA at 
the behest of a recording industry just beginning to worry that advances in 
digital recording might lead to fewer sales of recorded music.46  The rationale 
underlying the industry’s worry was simple: If technology continued to 
progress such that users could make and freely transmit “perfect” digital copies 
of sound recordings, these copies would replace (or at least negatively impact) 
physical sales of recorded music.47  While Congress seems to have accepted 
the recording industry’s rationale, the performance right it granted to copyright 
owners of sound recordings was different from the performance right enjoyed 
by copyright owners of musical works.  The new “digital performance right” of 
§ 106(6), as it came to be known,48 had significant limitations. 
One major limitation of the digital performance right was the DPRA’s 
implementation (by means of amendment to the Copyright Act) of a statutory 
licensing scheme for sound recordings.49  A new § 114 allowed certain 
“qualified”50 services to publicly perform sound recordings without consent 
from or negotiation with sound recording owners as long as proper royalties 
were paid.51  Copyright owners and users could voluntarily negotiate this 
royalty rate amongst themselves.52  If they failed to agree on an industry-wide 
licensing rate, either party could petition the Librarian of Congress to convene 
a Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel (“CARP”), which would then determine 
reasonable rates.53 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. DPRA § 106(6). 
 46. Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 488 & n.4 (3rd Cir. 2003) (explaining that 
when the DPRA was passed “the possible role of the commercially-nascent Internet in the 
transmission of music was not yet significant enough to be considered.”). 
 47. Paul Maloney, Copyright Law and the CRB: What Went Wrong?, RADIO AND INTERNET 
NEWSLETTER, Mar. 16, 2007, http://textpattern.kurthanson.com/crb/53/copyright-law-and-the-
crb-what-went-wrong.  In fact, digital copies of sound recordings are not “perfect” copies; they 
are “exact” copies.”  Id. 
 48. CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,086 (May 1, 2007) (codified at 37 C.F.R. 
pt. 380). 
 49. See 17 U.S.C. § 114 (1995). 
 50. Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 153 F.Supp.2d 763, 768 n.5 (E.D. Penn. 2001).  To 
qualify for a statutory license, digital audio transmitters (1) could not be “interactive;” (2) could 
“not use a signal that causes the receiver to change from one program channel to another;” (3) 
could “not preannounce the broadcast of particular songs;” and (4) were required, if feasible, to 
“include various information about the recording being transmitted.”  In other words, interactive 
and subscription services still had to directly negotiate licenses from sound recording owners. 
 51. Id. at 767.  Further, sound recording owners cannot prevent qualified users from using 
their works. Id. at 767–68. 
 52. Id.; DPRA § 114(e)(1). 
 53. Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 489 (3rd Cir. 2003); DPRA § 114(f)(2). 
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Under the DPRA, a CARP was directed to calculate digital performance 
royalty rates with the goal of achieving the following policy objectives of § 
801(b)(1) of the Copyright Act: 
(A) To maximize the availability of creative works to the public; (B) To afford 
the copyright owner a fair return for his creative work and the copyright user a 
fair income under existing economic conditions; (C) To reflect the relative 
roles of the copyright owner and the copyright user in the product made 
available to the public with respect to relative creative contribution, 
technological contribution, capital investment, cost, risk, and contribution to 
the opening of new markets for creative expression and media for their 
communication; (D) To minimize any disruptive impact on the structure of the 
industries involved and on generally prevailing industry practices.54 
As explained below, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (“DMCA”) 
replaced this policy-based standard for determining digital performance 
royalties with the arm’s-length willing buyer/willing seller standard.55  
However, it should be noted that the § 801(b) policy-based standard was not 
discarded altogether; It continues to be the standard by which the CRB sets 
royalty rates for all other forms of radio subject to the § 114 statutory license 
(i.e. satellite radio).56 
Congress further limited the digital performance right by providing 
exemptions from the new statutory licensing scheme in § 114(d)(1)(A).  In 
particular, it provided that non-interactive, “nonsubscription broadcast 
transmission[s]” were exempt from paying digital performance royalties.57  
The classic example of such a transmission is a traditional over-the-air radio 
broadcast.58  Congress explained that it did “not want to impose any ‘new and 
unreasonable burdens on radio and television broadcasters, which often 
promote, and appear to pose no threat to, the distribution of sound 
recordings.’”59  Interestingly, webcasters were initially able to take advantage 
of this exemption because, at the time the law was written, Internet speeds 
were still slow and webcasting technology was still in its developmental 
 
 54. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, §§ 801(b)(1)(A)–(D), 90 Stat. 2541 (1976); 
see DPRA § 114(f)(2). 
 55. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 56. See In the Matter of Determination of Rates and Terms for Preexisting Subscription and 
Satellite Digital Audio Radio Services, No. 2006-1, available at http://www.loc.gov/crb/ 
proceedings/2006-1/sdars-final-rates-terms.pdf; Adjustment of Rates and Terms for Preexisting 
Subscription and Satellite Digital Audio Radio Services, 71 Fed. Reg. 1455 (Jan. 9, 2006). 
 57. DPRA, § 114(d)(1)(A)(iii). 
 58. Bonneville Two, 347 F.3d at 488. 
 59. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-274, at 14 (1995)). 
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stages.60  However, this apparent oversight (and the loophole it created for 
webcasters) would be addressed in 1998, the year Congress passed the DMCA. 
2. The DMCA 
Congress’s enactment of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 
(“DMCA”) significantly amended § 114’s digital performance right.61  The 
recording industry was again the impetus behind enactment of the DMCA, 
much as it had been with the DPRA.  The difference this time was that the 
industry was really convinced that technology advancements, including those 
made in Internet radio technology, were causing people to buy fewer records.62  
Accordingly, the industry pushed Congress for stronger protection of sound 
recordings, and Congress responded by expanding the scope of § 114’s 
compulsory licensing scheme.63 
In drafting the DMCA, Congress clarified the nature of webcasters’ 
relationship to the § 114 compulsory license by amending § 114(d)(1)(A) so as 
to make non-interactive, Internet-only webcasting explicitly subject to the 
statutory licensing scheme.64  In addition, Congress removed two exemptions 
from § 114(d) that may have caused some confusion for Internet-only 
webcasters.65  But while Congress clarified Internet-only webcasters’ 
relationship to the statutory licensing scheme, it failed to explain simulcasting 
webcasters’ relationship to the licensing scheme with the same specificity. 
After the DMCA was passed, simulcasting radio stations still argued that 
digital retransmissions qualified as § 114(d)(1)(A) “nonsubscription broadcast 
transmissions” since Congress had left that section untouched when drafting 
the DMCA.66  Thus, in March of 2000, the Recording Industry Association of 
America (“RIAA”) petitioned the Copyright Office for a rulemaking to clarify 
whether these simulcasters were exempt from or subject to the statutory 
licensing scheme.67  On December 11, 2000, the Register of Copyrights issued 
an administrative final ruling that “AM/FM broadcast signals transmitted 
 
 60. Matt Jackson, Comment, From Broadcast to Webcast: Copyright Law and Streaming 
Media, 11 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 447, 457 (2003). 
 61. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) 
[hereinafter DMCA]. 
 62. Bonneville Two, 347 F.3d  at 489. 
 63. CARP Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,240 (July 8, 2002) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 261). 
 64. Id.  See DMCA §§ 114(d)(2), 114(f)(2). 
 65. Bonneville Two, 347 F.3d at 489. 
 66. Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 153 F.Supp.2d 763, 765 (E.D. Penn. 2001). 
 67. Bonneville Two, 347 F.3d at 489–90.  See RIAA, Who We Are, http://www.riaa.com 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2008) (“The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) is the trade 
group that represents the U.S. recording industry.”  Its “members create, manufacture and/or 
distribute approximately 90% of all legitimate sound recordings produced and sold in the United 
States.”). 
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simultaneously over a digital communications network, such as the Internet, 
[were] not exempted by § 114(d)(1)(A).”68  Simulcasters challenged this ruling 
on constitutional grounds, arguing that it was promulgated in excess of the 
Copyright Office’s statutory authority.69  Both the district court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the 
Copyright Office’s ruling as constitutional.70  As a result, simulcasters joined 
Internet-only webcasters under § 114’s licensing scheme. 
Maybe more significant, though, was the fact that the DMCA changed the 
standard by which § 114 compulsory licensing rates were determined.  Under 
the DPRA, Congress had directed digital performance royalty rates to be 
calculated with the aim of achieving the policy objectives of § 801(b)(1) of the 
Copyright Act.71  But under the DMCA, Congress discarded these policy 
objectives in favor of a new standard pursuant to which royalty rates should 
“most clearly represent the rates and terms that would have been negotiated in 
the marketplace between a willing buyer and a willing seller.”72 
III.  THE ROYALTY RATE DETERMINATIONS 
Three different adjudicatory bodies have been charged with the task of 
setting copyright royalty rates.  The first was the Copyright Royalty Tribunal 
(“CRT”), created under the Copyright Act of 1976 as part of the legislative 
branch.73  The CRT set statutory license rates for cable retransmissions, 
jukeboxes, recordings, and noncommercial broadcasts of protected works.74  
The CRT existed until December 17, 1993, when it was replaced by an ad hoc 
Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel (“CARP”) system pursuant to the 
Copyright Tribunal Reform Act of 1993.75  Once a CARP convened for a 
particular proceeding, it had 180 days to recommend royalty rates to the 
Librarian of Congress.76  The Librarian of Congress, after consulting with the 
 
 68. Public Performance of Sound Recordings: Definition of a Service, 65 Fed. Reg. 77,292 
(Dec. 11, 2000) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201). 
 69. Id. at 77,293. 
 70. See Bonneville Two, 347 F.3d 485, 487 (3rd Cir. 2003). 
 71. DPRA, Pub. L. No. 104-39, § 114(f)(2), 109 Stat. 336 (1995); see Copyright Act of 
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 801(b)(1), 90 Stat. 2541 (1976). 
 72. DMCA, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 114(f)(2)(B), 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). 
 73. Copyright Act of 1976 § 801 et seq. 
 74. Id.  The CRT consisted of five commissioners appointed to seven-year terms by the 
President with advice and consent from the Senate.  Copyright Act of 1976 § 802. 
 75. See Copyright Royalty Tribunal Reform Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-198, 107 Stat. 
2304 (1993).  A CARP consisted of three members: two chosen by the Librarian of Congress on 
recommendation from the Register of Copyrights, and a third chosen by the first two members to 
act as chairperson.  All members were chosen from lists provided by professional arbitration 
associations.  Copyright Royalty Tribunal Reform Act of 1993 § 802 (1993). 
 76. Copyright Royalty Tribunal Reform Act of 1993 § 802(e). 
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Register of Copyrights, had sixty days to accept or reject a panel’s rate 
recommendation.77  The CARP system existed until 2004, when it was 
replaced by the current Copyright Royalty Board (“CRB”) pursuant to the 
Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act.78  The CRB consists of three 
Copyright Royalty Judges who serve for six-year, staggered terms.79 
In 2002, the Librarian of Congress made the first-ever determination of 
webcaster digital performance royalties upon rejecting rates recommended by a 
CARP.80  Five years later, in 2007, the CRB made the second-ever 
determination of such royalties.81  In making these determinations, both 
entities employed the same willing buyer/willing seller standard:82 
In establishing rates and terms for transmissions by eligible nonsubscription 
services and new subscription services, the copyright arbitration royalty panel 
shall establish rates and terms that most clearly represent the rates and terms 
that would have been negotiated in the marketplace between a willing buyer 
and a willing seller. In determining such rates and terms, the copyright 
arbitration royalty panel shall base its decision on economic, competitive and 
programming information presented by the parties, including— 
(i) whether use of the service may substitute for or may promote the sales 
of phonorecords or otherwise may interfere with or may enhance the sound 
recording copyright owner’s other streams of revenue from its sound 
recordings; and 
(ii) the relative roles of the copyright owner and the transmitting entity in 
the copyrighted work and the service made available to the public with 
respect to relative creative contribution, technological contribution, capital 
investment, cost, and risk. 
In establishing such rates and terms, the copyright arbitration royalty panel 
may consider the rates and terms for comparable types of digital audio 
 
 77. Copyright Royalty Tribunal Reform Act of 1993 § 802(f). 
 78. See Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419, 118 
Stat. 2341 (2004). 
 79. Copyright Royalty Board, http://www.loc.gov/crb/background (last visited Apr. 8, 
2008).  Currently, James Scott Sledge, William J. Roberts, and Stanley C. Wisniewski are the 
Copyright Royalty Judges, with Sledge acting as Chief Judge.  They were appointed on January 
11, 2006.  Id. 
 80. See CARP Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,240 (July 8, 2002) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 
261). 
 81. See generally CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084 (May 1, 2007) (codified at 37 
C.F.R. pt. 380) (Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings; 
Final Rule). 
 82. CARP Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. at 45,243–44; CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 
24,087. 
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transmission services and comparable circumstances under voluntary license 
agreements negotiated under subparagraph (A) [of § 114(f)(2)].83 
Both rate determinations are explained below, with emphasis on the CRB’s 
2007 decision. 
A. The 2002 Rate Determination 
In July of 2001, the CARP began proceedings to determine webcaster 
royalty rates for two separate licensing periods, ranging from October 28, 1998 
to December 31, 2002.84  During the proceedings, the CARP considered 
differing rate proposals from the RIAA and individual webcasters.85  The 
RIAA proposed a royalty of either $.004 per performance or 15% of a 
webcaster’s gross revenue; in addition, it suggested that each webcaster pay a 
minimum annual fee of $5,000 per webcasting service.86  The RIAA derived 
these proposed rates from twenty-six voluntarily negotiated agreements 
between itself and individual webcasters.87  Webcasters, on the other hand, 
proposed rates of $.00014 per song, $.0021 per hour, or 3% of a webcaster’s 
gross revenue, to be paid in addition to a minimum annual fee of $250.88 
The CARP began by considering whether any of the RIAA’s twenty-six 
agreements represented the price that willing buyers and sellers would have 
agreed to in the hypothetical marketplace.89  It determined that one agreement, 
between Yahoo! and the RIAA, was sufficiently representative.90  The other 
twenty-five agreements were disregarded on the grounds that many of them 
were between the RIAA and smaller webcasters, whose bargaining power was 
unequal to that of the RIAA.91  Based largely on the Yahoo! agreement, the 
CARP determined that Internet-only webcasters should pay $0.0014 per 
 
 83. 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B)(1998). Compare 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B)(1998) and § 
114(f)(2)(B)(2004) to note changes in the statutory language made after the CRB replaced the 
CARP. 
 84. CARP Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. at 45,241. 
 85. Id. at 45,241–42. 
 86. Id. at 45,241. In addition to charging the CARP with setting royalty rates, the Copyright 
Act directed the panel to set a “minimum fee for each such type of service.” § 114(f)(2)(B)(1998).  
Note also that paying a “per-performance” royalty is the equivalent of paying a royalty “per song, 
per listener”—meaning that the royalty is calculated by multiplying the royalty rate for 
broadcasting one song by the number of listening devices receiving that broadcast at a certain 
time. See id. at 45,273. 
 87. CARP Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. at 45,241. 
 88. Id. at 45,242.  Compared to a “per-performance” royalty, a “per-song” royalty is paid for 
a single transmission regardless of how many people hear it at the time.  See id. at 45,273. 
 89. CARP Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. at 45,244–45. 
 90. Id. at 45,245. 
 91. Jeremy Delibero, Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels and the Webcasting 
Controversy: The Antithesis of Good Alternative Dispute Resolution, 5 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 
83, 95–96 (2005). 
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performance, that simulcasters should pay $0.0007 per performance, and that 
each webcasting service should pay an additional minimum annual fee of 
$500.92  The CARP recommended these rates to the Librarian of Congress in 
February of 2002.93 
Upon recommendation from the Register of Copyrights, the Librarian of 
Congress rejected the CARP’s suggested rates because they did not reflect the 
true rates that willing buyers and sellers would have agreed to in the 
marketplace.94  Accordingly, the Librarian reduced the proposed rate for 
Internet-only webcasters from $0.0014 to $0.0007 in order to achieve parity 
with the simulcasting rate.95  However, the Librarian upheld the $500 
minimum annual fee as reasonable in light of administrative licensing costs.96  
The main reason the Librarian of Congress reduced the Internet-only 
webcasting rate was a lack of evidence in the record showing that Internet-only 
webcasting was of less promotional value to copyright owners than was 
simulcasting.97  Apparently, the CARP assumed this fact when it decided that 
Internet-only webcasters should pay higher rates than simulcasters.98  After 
reducing the Internet-only rate, the Librarian of Congress issued his final 
determination of rates on July 8, 2002.99  These rates would be short-lived, 
though, given that the licensing period was scheduled to expire on December 
31 of that same year.100 
Fortunately, the Librarian of Congress was aware of this fact.101  In 
January of 2002, before rates for the 1998 to 2002 licensing period were 
 
 92. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT OF THE COPYRIGHT ARBITRATION ROYALTY PANEL, 
APP. A, SUMMARY OF ROYALTY RATES FOR § 114(f)(2) and § 112(e) STATUTORY LICENSES A-1 
(2002), http://www.copyright.gov/carp/webcasting_rates_a.pdf.  See also U.S. COPYRIGHT 
OFFICE, SUMMARY OF THE DETERMINATION OF THE LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS ON RATES AND 
TERMS FOR WEBCASTING AND EPHEMERAL RECORDINGS, http://www.copyright.gov/carp/ 
webcasting_rates_final.html (2003). 
 93. CARP Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. at 45,241. 
 94. Id. at 45,243.  Marybeth Peters was the Register of Copyrights at this time; James H. 
Billington was the Librarian of Congress.  Id. at 45,276. 
 95. Id. at 45,272.  The Librarian of Congress reviewed the CARP’s recommendation under 
an arbitrary and capricious standard.  Id. at 45,242–43. 
 96. Id. at 45,272.  See also 37 C.F.R. 261.3(e) (2007). 
 97. CARP Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. at 45,252 (“The fundamental flaw in the Panel’s 
analysis . . . is the Panel’s determination that the differential rate structure reflects a true 
distinction in value between Internet-only transmissions and radio retransmissions based upon the 
promotional value to the record companies and performers due to airplay of their music by local 
radio stations.”). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 45,240. 
 100. Id. at 45,241. 
 101. See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 5,693, 5,694 (Feb. 6, 2004) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 262–63) [hereinafter 2003 
Determination]. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] A DIGITAL CRY FOR HELP 441 
recommended by the CARP, the Librarian had initiated proceedings to set rates 
for the upcoming 2003 to 2004 licensing period.102  Even with this head start, 
however, the Librarian would not issue his final ruling on rates for the 2003 to 
2004 period until February 6, 2004.103  Interestingly, these rates would largely 
be influenced by webcasters’ reaction to the Librarian’s 2002 rates.104 
Neither the RIAA nor webcasters were pleased with the Librarian’s 2002 
determination of rates under the willing buyer/willing seller standard.  
Webcasters in particular responded with vocal opposition, claiming that the 
rates were excessive to the point they would likely drive webcasters of all sizes 
out of business.105  The controversy prompted litigation, appeals, and proposed 
legislation as webcasters explored a variety of means for obtaining relief from 
the rates.  For instance, those that partook in the CARP proceedings appealed 
to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.106  
Smaller webcasters, many of whom did not partake in the CARP proceedings 
because of the excessive costs required to do so,107 pursued other options.  
Most notably, small webcasters petitioned Congress for legislative relief.  As a 
result, small webcasters gained support for their cause under the guise of a 
proposed bill, entitled the Internet Radio Fairness Act (“IRFA”), which 
managed to pinpoint a serious problem with the royalty rate system.108  
Significantly, the IRFA would have eliminated the willing buyer/willing seller 
as the guidepost for future determinations of digital performance royalties.109  
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 5,693. 
 104. See id. at 5,693–95. 
 105. See, e.g., Paul Maloney, Today is the Day of Silence, RADIO AND INTERNET 
NEWSLETTER, May 1, 2002, http://www.kurthanson.com/archive/news/050102/index.shtml 
(“Decrying a government-proposed royalty rate on musical recordings that they say would make 
operating their businesses impossible, hundreds of webcasters and broadcasters—totaling literally 
thousands of streams—are suspending their normal programming today.”).  Many webcasters 
actually ceased webcasting because of the 2002 rates.  See, e.g., Jefferson Graham, Royalty Fees 
Killing Most Internet Radio Stations, USA TODAY, July 22, 2002, at D1 (“More than 200 
Internet-based radio stations have shut down because of a royalty fee that takes effect in 
September, and more are closing daily.”). 
 106. See Stuart A. Maxey, Note, That CARP is No Keeper: Copyright Arbitration Royalty 
Panels—Change is Needed, Here is Why, and How, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 385, 395 (2003). 
 107. Id. at 395–96 (discussing the costs of CARP proceedings).  See also Copyright 
Arbitration Panel (CARP) Structure and Process: Hearing before the House Subcomm. on 
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop., 107th Cong. 3 (2002), available at 
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/websites/www.judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/80194.pdf (Rep. 
Howard L. Berman explains the often great expense of participating in a CARP proceeding). 
 108. See H.R. 5285, 107th Cong. (2002) (introduced by Rep. Jay Inslee, D-WA, on July 26, 
2002), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_bills& 
docid=f:h5285ih.txt.pdf. 
 109. Id. (“Section 114(f)(2)(B) of [17 U.S.C.] is amended—(1) by striking ‘Such rates and 
terms shall distinguish’ and all that follows through ‘capital investment, cost, and risk.’; and (2) 
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But, the IRFA never became law.110  Instead, an untimely failure in 
negotiations between the RIAA and webcasters led Congress to pass the Small 
Webcasters Settlement Act of 2002 (“SWSA”), which effectively negated any 
immediate need for the IRFA.111 
The SWSA empowered SoundExchange,112 then the royalty collection arm 
of the RIAA, to directly negotiate royalty rates with small commercial and 
noncommercial webcasters.113  It also provided the parties with an additional 
six to twelve months in which to negotiate lower rates.114  Under the SWSA, 
any agreement reached between SoundExchange and webcasters would be 
published in the Federal Register.115  Further, qualified webcasters could opt-in 
to those agreements instead of paying the Librarian of Congress’s default 
rates.116 
After President Bush signed the SWSA into law on December 4, 2002, 
SoundExchange and a group of small commercial webcasters negotiated a 
settlement agreement that allowed “small” webcasters to retroactively pay the 
greater of 8% of their revenue or 5% of their expenses for the period of 1998 to 
2002.117  For 2003 and 2004, small webcasters could pay the greater of 7% of 
 
by inserting after ‘as the parties may agree.’ the following: ‘The copyright arbitration royalty 
panel shall establish rates and terms in accordance with the objectives set forth in section 
801(b)(1).’”). 
 110. See THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, BILL SUMMARY & STATUS FOR THE 107TH 
CONGRESS: H.R. 5285, http://thomas.loc.gov/. 
 111. See Small Webcasters Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-321, 116 Stat. 2780 
(2002) (hereinafter SWSA), available at http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/pl107-321.pdf.  
The SWSA resulted from The Helms Amendment to the Small Webcaster Amendments Act of 
2002, H.R. 5469, 107th Cong. (2002) (emphasis added).  See Kidd, supra note 26, at 355–360. 
 112. See SoundExchange, http://soundexchange.com (“SoundExchange is an independent, 
nonprofit performance rights organization that is designated by the U.S. Copyright Office to 
collect and distribute digital performance royalties for featured recording artists and sound 
recording copyright owners . . . SoundExchange currently represents over 3,500 record labels and 
over 31,000 featured artists.”) (last visited Ap. 13, 2008).  CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 
24,084, 24,102 & n.59 (May 1, 2007) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380) (explaining that 
SoundExchange once was an unincorporated division of the RIAA, but is now an independent 
entity). 
 113. Kidd, supra note 26, at 358–59 (“Noncommercial stations were given until June 20, 
2003 and small commercial webcasters until December 15, 2003 to negotiate royalty rates [with 
SoundExchange].”). 
 114. Id. at 359. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 361–62. 
 117. See Notification of Agreement under the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, 67 
Fed. Reg. 78,510, 78,510–11 (Dec. 24, 2002) (not codified in 37 C.F.R. pt. 261) [hereinafter First 
Agreement].  To qualify as an “eligible small webcaster” under this agreement, a webcaster’s 
gross revenue could not exceed $1 million to $1.25 million from 1998 to 2004.  Id. at 78,513, 
App. A (appendix not codified). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] A DIGITAL CRY FOR HELP 443 
their expenses or 10% of their first $250,000 in revenue, plus 12% of any 
revenue above that amount.118 
On May 20, 2003, a second SWSA settlement set alternate rates for all 
nonsubscription webcasting services (including large and small commercial 
webcasters) for 2003 and 2004.119  Significantly, this broader agreement gave 
nonsubscription services the option to choose between per-performance and 
per-aggregate-tuning-hour (“ATH”) payment schemes.120  The per-
performance rate was set at $0.000762; the per-ATH option ranged from 
$0.000762 to $0.0117, depending on the type of programming involved.121 
Finally, a third SWSA agreement between SoundExchange and 
noncommercial webcasters was published on June 11, 2003, with similar terms 
to the May 20th agreement.122  Under these three agreements, SoundExchange 
essentially agreed to industry-wide rates that were lower and offered more 
payment options than the Librarian of Congress’s default rates.123  Webcasters 
who had opted-in to any prior SWSA settlement agreement could notify 
SoundExchange in writing if they wanted to opt-in to any later SWSA 
agreement.124  Because the industry-wide SWSA settlement agreements 
extended through 2004, the Librarian of Congress did not need to convene a 
CARP to determine the default 2003 and 2004 licensing rates.125  The 
Librarian merely adopted the negotiated rates, and webcasters ended up paying 
these rates through 2005 and 2006.126 
Overall, while the SWSA provided webcasters with some short-term relief 
from the CARP’s 2002 rate determination, it ultimately failed to address the 
 
 118. Id. at 75,111. 
 119. See Digital Performance Right in Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 68 Fed. Reg. 
27,506, 27,506–07 (May, 20, 2003) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 262) [hereinafter Second 
Agreement].  Note that this agreement actually superseded and amended a May 1, 2003 
settlement agreement.  Id. at 27,506.  See 68 Fed. Reg. 23,241, 23,241–43 (May 1, 2003). 
 120. Second Agreement, 68 Fed. Reg. at 27,508–09.  An aggregate tuning hour (“ATH”) is a 
method of calculating the total number of hours of programming transmitted by webcasters to 
listeners across the country.  Thus, one ATH is the equivalent of one listener listening for one 
hour, or two listeners listening for half an hour each, and so on.  See, e.g., CRB Determination, 72 
Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,110 (May 1, 2007) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380) (defining Aggregate 
Tuning Hours). 
 121. Second Agreement, 68 Fed. Reg. at 27,508–09. 
 122. Notification of Agreement under the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 35,008, 35,008–12 (June 11, 2003) [hereinafter Third Agreement].  See also Second 
Agreement, 68 Fed. Reg. at 27,510. 
 123. See Third Agreement, 68 Fed. Reg. at 35,009–11.  See also Second Agreement, 68 Fed. 
Reg. at 27,510. 
 124. Third Agreement, 68 Fed. Reg. at 35,009–10. 
 125. Second Agreement, 68 Fed. Reg. at 27,506. 
 126. Id.  However webcasters would only get the benefit of these rates for 2005 since the 
CRB’s 2007 rate determination applied retroactively to 2006. CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 
24,084, 24,084 (May 1, 2007) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380). 
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underlying problem pinpointed by the IRFA, namely, the flawed standard by 
which webcaster royalty rates are determined under the Copyright Act.  Thus, 
the willing buyer/willing seller standard survived to see a second rate 
determination. 
B. The 2007 Rate Determination 
After replacing the CARP system in 2004, the CRB received its first case 
in early 2005 when it was petitioned to set new webcaster royalty rates for the 
licensing period of January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2010.127  After an initial 
discovery period and the filing of written statements, twenty-three parties 
remained to make their cases before the CRB.128  Litigation consumed half of 
2005 and all of 2006.129  The CRB made its initial determination of rates and 
terms on March 2, 2007, three months after hearing closing arguments.130  The 
CRB’s decision was met by motions for rehearing filed by nearly all parties.131  
All such motions, however, were subsequently denied because none of them 
demonstrated that the CRB’s initial determination was unsupported by the 
evidence, was erroneous, was contrary to legal requirements, or justified the 
introduction of new evidence.132  The CRB issued its final ruling on May 1, 
2007.133 
In that ruling, the CRB began by laying out the willing buyer/willing seller 
standard pursuant to which the Copyright Royalty Judges (“Judges”) would 
attempt to determine the prices that webcasters and record companies would 
 
 127. CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,084–86. 
 128. Id.  (“The parties to this proceeding are: (i) Digital Media Association and certain of its 
member companies that participated in this proceeding, namely: America Online, Inc. (“AOL”), 
Yahoo!, Inc. (“Yahoo!”), Microsoft, Inc. (“Microsoft”), and Live365, Inc. (“Live365”) 
(collectively referred to as “DiMA”); (ii) “Radio Broadcasters” (this designation was adopted by 
the parties): namely, Bonneville International Corp., Clear Channel Communications, Inc., 
National Religious Broadcasters Music License Committee (“NRBMLC”), Susquehanna Radio 
Corp.; (iii) SBR Creative Media, Inc. (“SBR”) and the “Small Commercial Webcasters” (this 
designation was adopted by the parties): namely, AccuRadio, LLC, Digitally Imported, Inc., 
Radioio.com LLC, Discombobulated, LLC, 3WK, LLC, Radio Paradise, Inc.; (iv) National 
Public Radio, Inc. (“NPR”), Corporation for Public Broadcasting-Qualified Stations (“CPB”), 
National Religious Broadcasters Noncommercial Music License Committee (“NRBNMLC”), 
Collegiate Broadcasters, Inc. (“CBI”), Intercollegiate Broadcasting System, Inc., (“IBS”), and 
Harvard Radio Broadcasting, Inc. (“WHRB”); (v) Royalty Logic, Inc. (“RLI”); and (vi) 
SoundExchange, Inc. (“SoundExchange”).”). 
 129. Id. at 24,084–85. 
 130. Id. at 24,085. 
 131. Id. at 24,085 & n.2 (“Motions were filed by DiMA, IBS, WHRB, NPR, Radio 
Broadcasters, RLI, Small Commercial Webcasters, SoundExchange and CBI.”).  See supra note 
128 for party abbreviations. 
 132. CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,085–86. 
 133. Id. at 24,084. 
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have agreed to in a hypothetical market not restricted by a statutory license.  
The Judges granted that this hypothetical marketplace would invariably consist 
of “significant variations, among both buyers and sellers, in terms of 
sophistication, economic resources, business exigencies, and myriad other 
factors.”134  However, they determined that Congress would have been aware 
of these variations when it created the standard.  Thus, they concluded that the 
language of the statute demonstrated Congress’s intent that the Judges make 
their determination of webcaster royalty rates “absent [these] special 
circumstances.”135 
The CRB’s application of willing buyer/willing seller standard can be 
broken into two parts.  The first addressed the most appropriate rate structure 
for webcasters; the second attempted to determine the exact rates that the 
parties would have agreed to in the hypothetical marketplace. 
1. Appropriate Rate Structures 
The CRB’s first task was to determine the most appropriate type of rate 
structure for commercial and noncommercial webcasters, respectively.136  The 
CRB distinguished noncommercial and commercial webcasters on the basis 
that they “represent different segments of the marketplace.”137  The Judges 
considered various proposals from SoundExchange and from webcasters in 
making its decision.138  Commercial webcasters proposed a rate structure under 
which webcasters could elect to pay under per-performance, per-ATH, or 
percentage-of-revenue metrics.139  SoundExchange proposed alternative 
payment metrics for commercial webcasters, consisting of per-performance 
and percentage-of-gross-revenue options.140  After considering the parties’ 
proposals and expert witness testimony, the CRB decided that the appropriate 
rate structure for commercial webcasters was solely a per-performance usage 
rate.141 
When small commercial webcasters objected that a percentage-of-revenue 
structure was necessary for the “nascent” Internet radio industry, or at least 
required for small entrepreneurs to grow their businesses, the Judges’ response 
was that small webcasters were not really as concerned with the structure of 
the rate as they were with the amount of the rate, the latter of which would 
 
 134. Id. at 24,087. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 24,088.  A “commercial webcaster” is a webcaster and § 114 compulsory licensee, 
and is neither a nonprofit nor a government-owned organization.  See id. at 24,111 (defining 
commercial and noncommercial webcasters). 
 137. CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,091. 
 138. Id. at 24,088. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
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ultimately determine the financial viability of webcasters’ businesses.142  The 
Judges emphasized that it was not their job to “guarantee a profitable business 
to every market entrant” and commented that treating small webcasters 
differently from other webcasters would involve “making a policy decision 
rather than applying the willing buyer/willing seller standard of the Copyright 
Act.”143  Moreover, the Judges explained that they preferred a metric based on 
performances because it was “directly tied to the nature of the right being 
licensed,” whereas “revenue merely serves as ‘a proxy’ for . . . 
‘performances.’”144  Further, the Judges thought a revenue-based system would 
lead to auditing and enforcement problems and an overall increase in 
transaction costs.145  For these reasons, the Judges decided that a per-
performance metric alone was the most appropriate payment structure for 
commercial webcasters. 
The CRB next turned its attention to noncommercial webcasters.  
Noncommercial webcasters had proposed a variety of distinct rate structures, 
most of which revolved around annual per-station flat fees.146  For example, 
NPR proposed an annual $80,000 flat fee that would cover all of its stations 
and would adjust annually for the cost of living.147  SoundExchange, which 
believed that noncommercial and commercial webcasters should be treated 
alike, proposed the same per-performance and revenue-based structures that it 
had for commercial webcasters.148  After considering the proposals and expert 
testimony, the CBR determined that the appropriate rate structure for 
noncommercial webcasters was “an annual flat per-station rate structure . . . up 
to a specified cap coupled with a per-performance rate for use by 
noncommercial services that exceed the cap.”149 
The CRB gave several reasons for its decision.  Because noncommercial 
rates had traditionally been structured as flat-fee arrangements, the Judges 
decided to maintain this distinction from commercial webcasters.150  Further, 
the Judges were worried that the line between noncommercial and commercial 
webcasters was starting to blur.  The Judges decided to further preserve the 
distinction between the types of webcasters by placing a cap on the amount of 
 
 142. CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,089 (quoting Kurt Hanson, CEO/President of 
AccuRadio, LLC) (emphasis added). 
 143. Id. at 24,088 n.8. 
 144. Id. at 24,089 (quoting Dr. Adam B. Jaffe, Brandeis University, professor in economics). 
 145. Id. at 24,089–90. 
 146. Id. at 24,090. 
 147. Id. (explaining that NPR has roughly 798 stations).  Other proposed flat fees proposed by 
noncommercial webcasters ranged from a twenty-five dollar annual rate for smaller collegiate 
educational stations to $500 per year for noncommercial music stations.  See, id. at 24,090–91. 
 148. CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,090. 
 149. Id. at 24,091. 
 150. Id. 
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hours a noncommercial station could broadcast under the flat fee.151  If a 
noncommercial webcaster exceeded the hourly cap, it would have to pay 
royalties at commercial per-performance rates.152 
In sum, the CRB concluded in the first part of its analysis that commercial 
webcasters should pay according to a per-performance rate and that 
noncommercial webcasters should pay an annual flat per-station rate, capped 
and coupled with a per-performance rate for any use in excess of the cap. 
2. Royalty Rates in the Hypothetical Market 
The second part of the CRB’s analysis attempts to determine the royalty 
rates that would have been negotiated by willing buyers and sellers in a 
hypothetical marketplace not constrained by a statutory license.153  Both 
SoundExchange and webcasters agreed that the best way to determine such 
rates would be to use comparable marketplace agreements as “benchmarks” for 
guidance.154  However, the parties disagreed on how to define the hypothetical 
seller’s marketplace: SoundExchange blamed webcasters for falsely 
characterizing the marketplace as perfectly competitive; webcasters claimed 
that SoundExchange viewed the marketplace as a monopoly in favor of the 
seller.155 
In settling the dispute, the CRB referred to the CARP’s 2002 analysis of 
the relevant marketplace.156  The CARP had determined that the target market 
should be a “competitive” market—not a monopoly or a perfectly competitive 
market—in which record companies were the appropriate hypothetical 
seller.157  The Judges adopted this definition of the pertinent target market; 
further, they chose to incorporate the two statutory factors of the willing 
buyer/willing seller test into their search for the most appropriate benchmark in 
the target market.158 
The CRB accepted proposals from the parties on what they thought the 
appropriate benchmarks would be, again treating commercial and 
noncommercial webcasters separately.159  Commercial webcasters suggested 
that the most appropriate benchmarks were agreements between webcasters 
and performing rights organizations concerning licenses to publicly perform 
musical works.160  However, the CRB sided with SoundExchange and found 
 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,091. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 24,091–92. 
 159. CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,092. 
 160. Id. 
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that the most suitable benchmarks were royalty agreements between record 
companies and large interactive webcasting services regarding sound recording 
licenses.161  In accepting SoundExchange’s proposal, the Judges reasoned that 
the interactive and non-interactive webcasting markets were reasonably 
similar, especially after adjustments were made to account for the ability of 
interactive-webcasting listeners to influence the programming they hear.162  
Further, the Judges rejected commercial webcasters’ musical works benchmark 
because, while the buyers in both markets were the same, the sellers and the 
rights being sold in the two markets were different.163  In other words, the CRB 
rejected commercial webcasters’ benchmark because (1) those who typically 
sold public performance rights (i.e., performing rights organizations) differed 
from those who typically sold sound recording rights (i.e., record labels), and 
(2) public performance rights and sound recording rights were not sufficiently 
similar according to empirical evidence presented by SoundExchange, which 
showed that buyers paid much more for sound recording rights (e.g., in ring 
tones, digital downloads, music videos, etc.) than they did for public 
performance rights in musical works.164 
After deciding to use SoundExchange’s interactive webcasting benchmark, 
the CRB further decided to adopt the exact per-performance rates proposed by 
SoundExchange.165  Thus, the CRB ruled that commercial webcasters have to 
pay the following royalties per song, per listener from 2006 to 2010: $0.0008 
for 2006, $0.0011 for 2007, $0.0014 for 2008, $0.0018 for 2009, and $0.0019 
for 2010.166  In addition to adopting SoundExchange’s rate structure, the CRB 
also adopted SoundExchange’s proposed minimum annual fee of $500 per 
channel or station.167  The Judges explained that the relevant purpose of the 
minimum fee was to prevent situations where it would cost the license 
administrator more to administer the license than the license administrator 
would receive in performance royalties from the licensee.168 
The CRB next set out to determine the appropriate benchmark for 
noncommercial webcasters.169  Following the same analysis, the CRB first 
analyzed the parties’ proposals.170  SoundExchange again proposed the same 
interactive webcasting benchmark that it had proposed for commercial 
 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 24,094. 
 164. Id. 
 165. CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,095. 
 166. Id. at 24,096. 
 167. Id. at 24,096–97. 
 168. Id. at 24,096. 
 169. Id. at 24,097. 
 170. Id. 
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webcasters.171  Noncommercial webcasters argued that they were sufficiently 
different from commercial webcasters to warrant a unique benchmark.172  
Accordingly, they proposed two alternatives: one benchmark based on the rates 
that terrestrial radio stations pay to broadcast musical works over-the-air, and a 
second benchmark based on the rates found in a 1998-2004 agreement between 
NPR and SoundExchange concerning the streaming of sound recordings.173 
After considering the proposals, the CRB determined that neither party’s 
benchmarks adequately approximated the fee that noncommercial webcasters 
would have negotiated with record companies.174  However, after determining 
that the administrative costs incurred by record companies in licensing rights to 
both noncommercial and commercial webcasters were the same, the CRB 
decided that these administrative costs would best serve as its benchmark.175  
Thus, the CRB concluded that the appropriate flat fee would be an annual $500 
minimum per-channel or station flat fee for all noncommercial webcasters.176 
Furthermore, the CRB’s new rate structure required an ATH cap above 
which noncommercial webcasters would pay commercial per-performance 
rates.177  Recall that the purpose of the cap was to maintain the distinction 
between commercial and noncommercial stations.178  SoundExchange argued 
for a cap at 14,600 ATH based on expert testimony suggesting that the typical 
noncommercial station averaged twenty simultaneous listeners at any given 
time.179  But the CRB found that cap too limiting, especially after considering 
the terms of a 2001 agreement between NPR and SoundExchange, in which 
NPR negotiated substantially lower rates than commercial stations.180  This 
evidence convinced the Judges that, because NPR was sufficiently distinct 
from commercial webcasters in SoundExchange’s eyes, NPR’s average ATH 
rates would be a good place at which to establish its ATH cap.181  After 
consulting a 2004 survey regarding typical NPR streaming practices, the 
Judges found that NPR stations averaged 159,140 ATH per month (or 218 
simultaneous listeners per station).182  This was the ATH cap the CRB used.183 
 
 171. CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,097. 
 172. Id. at 24,097. 
 173. Id. at 24,098. 
 174. Id. at 24,099. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg at 24,099. 
 178. Id. at 24,091. 
 179. Id. at 24,099. 
 180. Id. (“Based on the available evidence, the typical NPR station . . . would not have been 
treated as the functional equivalent of a commercial station.”). 
 181. Id. at 24,100. 
 182. Id. at 24,099. 
 183. CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,100. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
450 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVII:427 
Year Fee Per 
Performance












 2006 to 
2010 
$500 per station or 
per channel up to 
159,140 ATH per 
month, plus 
commercial rates in 
excess of cap. 
The CRB’s final ruling came down on May 1, 2007.184  In its ruling, the 
CRB created a two year transition period (2006 and 2007) in which 
commercial webcasters could use ATH under previous rates to estimate usage 
and royalties.185  The CRB’s final rates look like this: 
 





3. Reactions to the 2007 Rates 
Webcasters of all sizes have decried the CRB’s new rates, which boast 
fewer payment options and significantly higher fees than the previous term.  
According to the SaveNetRadio Coalition,186 the latest royalties represent a 
300 percent to 1,200 percent increase over the royalties paid in the previous 
term.187  Joe Kennedy, CEO of the relatively large webcaster Pandora, admits 
that he is “not aware of any Internet radio service that believes it can sustain a 
 
 184. Id. at 24,084. 
 185. Id. at 24,100 n.55 (“The Judges recognize that a smooth transition from the prior fee 
regime to the new fee structure adopted by the Judges hereinabove may be aided by permitting 
the limited use of an ATH calculation option.”)  The ATH rates of the prior regime ranged from 
$0.0008 to $0.0169, depending on the type of programming (e.g. non-music, simulcasting, or 
other programming).  Id. at 24,096. 
 186. SaveNetRadio Coalition, http://www.savenetradio.org/about/index.html (“The 
SaveNetRadio Coalition is made up of artists, labels, listeners, and webcasters” with the common 
goal of creating “an environment where Internet radio, and the millions of artists it features, can 
continue to grow for generations to come.”).  John Draper, a hobbyist webcaster, purchased the 
domain name SaveNetRadio.org and “offered it to colleagues as a rallying point to fight back 
against the CRB’s increased rates.  Assael, supra note 15, at 32 (explaining that Draper’s monthly 
royalty payments increased from $120 to $6500 under the latest rate increase). 
 187. Press Release, SaveNetRadio Coalition, SaveNetRadio Coalition Joins the Fight to 
Preserve the Future of Internet Radio (Apr. 16, 2007), http://www.savenetradio.org/press_room/ 
press_releases/070416-savenetradio.pdf.  But see All Access Music Group, supra note 34, 
In 2006, the rate was raised [five percent] over the existing rate in 2005, but the rate had 
been flat for the seven years prior to that.  We figure the increase to [thirty-five percent] in 
2007, but that [i]s not much when you put that in context to the rate almost [ten] years 
ago. 
(quoting John Simson, Executive Director of SoundExchange). 
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business” under what he calls the “disastrous” new rates.188  Bill Goldsmith of 
Radio Paradise, a smaller webcaster, agrees: “This royalty structure would 
wipe out an entire class of business,” namely, “small independent webcasters 
such as myself [sic] and my wife.”189  Moreover, it has been reported that even 
large commercial webcasters like Yahoo! and AOL are considering shutting 
down their Internet radio operations altogether due to a reported thirty-eight 
percent increase in royalties.190 
As in 2002, webcasters have been actively seeking judicial and legislative 
relief from the royalty rates produced through application of the willing 
buyer/willing seller standard.  Their hope is to secure a “reasonable, long term 
solution” to the controversy that is not “subject to increase at the whim of the 
recording industry every five years” and that achieves “royalty parity” with 
other forms of radio (e.g. satellite and terrestrial radio).191 
On the other side of the controversy, the recording industry and 
SoundExchange have “applaud[ed] the higher worth” placed on sound 
recordings by the CRB.192  SoundExchange in particular has been quick to 
dismiss webcasters’ worries, predicting that the overall business of webcasting 
will continue to thrive despite the increase in rates.193  It maintains that the 
willing buyer/willing seller standard produces “fair and reasonable” rates and 
has called for webcasters to be “forthcoming” about the integrity of the current 
rate-determination process, categorizing webcasters’ complaints of unfairness 
as “not really about the process, but rather about the results.”194  Likewise, 
SoundExchange believes that webcasters have failed to appreciate the full 
 
 188. Van Buskirk, supra note 29; see also Pandora, http://www.pandora.com. 
 189. Van Buskirk, supra note 29; see also Radio Paradise, http://www.radioparadise.com. 
 190. Meg Tirrell, Yahoo, AOL May Abandon Web Radio After Royalties Rise, BLOOMBERG 
NEWS, Nov. 28, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&refer=us&sid= 
a0pKOrcpw6yE. 
 191. Press Release, SaveNetRadio Coalition, Small Webcasters Reject SoundExchange 
License (Sept. 19, 2007), http://www.savenetradio.org/press_room/press_releases/070919-
reject.pdf; Press Release, SaveNetRadio Coalition, Cable Radio Royalties Align with Internet 
Radio Legislation (Nov. 5, 2007), http://www.savenetradio.org/press_room/press_releases/ 
071105-cable_music_agreement.pdf.  Many webcasters also believe that terrestrial radio should 
be subject to the same royalty payments to which Internet and satellite radio are subject. See infra 
Part IV.2 for more discussion about this issue. 
 192. Dale Buss, Internet Radio in the Balance, 5 INTELL. PROP. L. & BUS. 14, 14 (2007). 
 193. Id. 
 194. Press Release, SoundExchange, Statement by SoundExchange Regarding the Copyright 
Royalty Board’s Decision Setting Webcasting Royalty Rates for 2006-2010 (Mar. 9, 2007), 
http://www.soundexchange.com (follow “News” hyperlink, then follow “SX News” hyperlink) 
(“The Copyright Royalty Board has issued a fair and reasonable decision . . . . ”); see also 
SoundExchange, SoundExchange Calls on Webcasters to Recognize Value of Music Performers 
to Web Business (Mar. 21, 2007), http://www.soundexchange.com (follow “News” hyperlink, 
then follow “SX News” hyperlink)(quoting John Simpson, Executive Director of Sound 
Exchange). 
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value that recording artists provide to the webcasting industry and that the 
CRB’s rates properly reflect this value.195  The CEO of SoundExchange has 
even suggested that higher royalty rates may actually be a valuable means for 
getting new and emerging artists radio airplay.196  Overall, the recording 
industry does not believe that webcasters should be able to digitally perform 
sound recordings without fully compensating artists for creating the music, 
even if that means webcasters cannot maintain financially viable businesses.197 
IV.  CRITICISMS OF THE RATE-DETERMINATION PROCESS 
As demonstrated by Part III above, each rate determination under the 
willing buyer/willing seller standard has generated significant conflict between 
the webcasting and recording industries.  Critics have generally characterized 
the underlying cause of the controversy as some fundamental flaw in the rate-
determination process.198  Likewise, Congress has noticed and even attempted 
to repair flaws in the determination process, most recently following the 
Librarian of Congress’s 2002 decision.199  However, after enacting the SWSA 
and replacing the CARP system with the CRB, Congress found itself 
confronted by a webcasting community seeking legislative and judicial relief 
for the second time in five years.  Apparently, Congress failed to address the 
relevant flaw in the determination process the first time around.  If that flaw 
manages to survive subsequent rate determinations, the webcasting and 
recording industries will likely find themselves in a cyclical struggle over 
 
 195. Id.  (“The music created by artists is the main reason why people listen to [I]nternet 
radio, and those artists should be fairly compensated for the value they bring to each webcaster’s 
business . . . . ”); see also Press Release, SoundExchange, Statements by SoundExchange 
Regarding the Copyright Royalty Board’s Decision Setting Webcasting Royalty Rates for 2006-
2010, supra note 194 (“Artists have earned the right to be fairly compensated for the performance 
of their work by webcasters who benefit—financially or otherwise—from their talents. . . . [I]t is 
our strong desire to see a thriving online radio marketplace . . . However, such a marketplace 
cannot be sustained without music, and the decision of the CRB fully recognizes and reflects this 
fact.”). 
 196. All Access Music Group, supra note 34 (Perhaps what will happen is that this will get 
radio more engaged in playing newer and emerging artists more often, instead of giving the 
majority [o]f airplay to established superstars.  Record companies and new artists would be more 
likely to make a deal, something like ‘We [woul]d love you to play this record, so we [wi]ll give 
you a break on performance rates for the first [ninety] days [the record’s] out. 
(quoting John Simson, Executive Director of Sound Exchange)). 
 197. Id. 
 198. See, e.g., Kidd, supra note 26, at 369 (“To avoid placing webcasters, small or large, in a 
royalty fight similar to the one that arose in 2002, Congress should reform the CARP process.”); 
see also CASTRO, supra note 20, at 1 (“Congress needs to enact legislation to reform the current 
system.”). 
 199. See, e.g., the Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 108-419, 118 
Stat. 2341 (2004); see also SWSA, Pub. L. No. 107-321, 116 Stat. 2780 (2002). 
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royalty rates that will prevent both industries and the public from realizing the 
full potential of Internet radio. 
Criticism of the current determination process runs both narrow and broad 
in scope.  The narrow line of criticism takes critical aim at the willing 
buyer/willing seller standard—particularly at its overall suitability for and 
effectiveness in determining Internet radio royalty rates.200  The broader line of 
criticism addresses concerns that the current rate-determination process 
discriminates against Internet radio on the basis of technology.201 
1. A Flawed Standard 
Several commentators have pinpointed the willing buyer/willing seller 
standard as one of the key flaws of the current determination process.202  In 
fact, it appears to be the very root of the royalty controversy.  Perhaps the 
simplest criticism of the willing buyer/willing seller standard is that it has 
twice proven ineffective at producing credibly fair royalty rates for the type of 
rights at issue in Internet webcasting.  The fact that it has produced extremely 
controversial royalty rates in the only two instances it has ever been applied 
provides reasonable support for this criticism.  Moreover, Congress arguably 
did not intend to induce a cyclical clash between the recording and webcasting 
industries when it adopted the willing buyer/willing seller standard in 1998.  
Further, there is no evidence indicating that Congress intended application of 
the standard to strengthen the digital performance right at the ultimate expense 
of small and noncommercial webcasters.  On the contrary, following the 
Librarian of Congress’s 2002 rate determination, Congress displayed a 
different intent when it rescued small commercial and noncommercial 
webcasters from apparently oppressive rates by enacting the Small Webcaster 
Settlement Act of 2002.203  In doing so—whether explicitly or not—Congress 
recognized for important policy reasons that it is in the “public interest” to 
protect these webcasters from being driven out of business.204 
Arguably then, the willing buyer/willing seller standard’s ineffectiveness 
stems from the fact that it has been interpreted as prohibiting the rate-setter 
from making similar public policy decisions in determining reasonable rates.205  
 
 200. Karen Fessler, Webcasting Royalty Rates, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 399, 411 (2003). 
 201. CASTRO, supra note 20, at 1. 
 202. See Fessler, supra note 200, at 411; see also Kidd, supra note 26, at 372; Jackson, supra 
note 60, at 476; Delibero, supra note 91, at 111–12. 
 203. See SWSA, Pub. L. No. 107-321, 116 Stat. 2780 (2002). 
 204. Id. (“It is, nevertheless, in the public interest for the parties to be able to enter into such 
an agreement without fear of liability for deviating from the fees and terms of the July 8 [2002] 
order . . . .”). 
 205. CARP Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,240, 45,254 (July 8, 2002) (codified at 37 C.F.R. 
pt. 261) (“Where the intent of Congress is to set a rate at fair market value, as in this proceeding, 
the Panel is not required to consider potential failure of those businesses that cannot compete in 
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If this interpretation of the statute is accurate, it would be contradictory and 
hypocritical for Congress to continue to direct the CRB to make policy-barren 
royalty determinations only to undercut the effect of those determinations at a 
later date with policy-based legislation (like the SWSA).  To avoid this result, 
it is imperative that Congress realize that public policy considerations should 
play an important role in the determination of webcaster royalty rates, 
particularly since the ultimate goal of copyright law in American jurisprudence 
is “to stimulate artistic creativity for the public good.”206  The willing 
buyer/willing seller standard—in its one-sided, fair market approach—has 
failed to stimulate artistic creativity for the public good.  Instead, it has twice 
produced royalty rates that threaten to drive webcasters—particularly those 
supplying the diversity that makes Internet radio such an appealing alternative 
to today’s homogeneous AM/FM stations—out of business.  The standard is 
flawed in this respect and needs to be replaced by a one that consistently 
encourages artistic creativity for the public good. 
Other criticisms of the willing buyer/willing seller standard focus more on 
perceived flaws in how the standard has been applied in the rate-determination 
process.  One such criticism is that application of the standard consistently 
produces a “one-size-fits-all” royalty rate that affects all webcasters—from 
basement hobbyists to multimillion-dollar corporations—without accounting 
for noticeable differences between types of webcasters.207  A close reading of § 
114(f)(2)(B) reveals that these “one-size-fits-all” rates are best explained as the 
product of statutory interpretation rather than clear statutory mandate.208  The 
 
the marketplace. . . . The law . . . is silent on what effect the rates should have on particular 
individual services who wish to operate under the license.”) 
See also CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,088 n.8 (May 1, 2007) (codified at 37 
C.F.R. pt. 380) (“It must be emphasized that, in reaching a determination, the Copyright Royalty 
Judges cannot guarantee a profitable business to every market entrant.  Indeed, the normal free 
market processes typically weed out those entities that have poor business models or are 
inefficient. . . . Furthermore, it would involve the Copyright Royalty Judges in making a policy 
decision rather than applying the willing buyer/willing seller standard of the Copyright Act.”). 
 206. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The immediate 
effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor.  But the 
ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.”) 
(emphasis added); see also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 
(1985) (“By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the 
economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”)(emphasis added).  These quotations 
represent the “utilitarian” justification for copyright law, which is currently the dominant 
justification in American jurisprudence.  CRAIG JOYCE ET. AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 52 n.2 
(LexisNexis 7th ed.) (2007). 
 207. Fessler, supra note 200, at 417.  While the CRB did, of course, make the minimal 
distinction between commercial and noncommercial webcasters, it refused to go any further.  See 
CRB Determinations, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,089 n.9. 
 208. 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B) (2004) states, 
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text directs the rate-setting body to set rates that “distinguish among the 
different types of eligible . . . services.”209  Moreover, it gives the rate-setters 
the uninhibited freedom to consider any criteria in making such distinctions.210 
One might expect a straightforward application of this language to produce 
multiple royalty rates based on the seemingly numerous grounds on which to 
distinguish webcasters,211 especially given that the CARP and the CRB have 
conceded that the webcasting market is composed of diverse members.212  And 
yet, in the actual rate determinations, industry-wide rates were established 
solely on the distinction between commercial and noncommercial webcasters.  
It seems contradictory for the rate-setting body to admit market diversity on 
the one hand and then attempt to set rates that “most” willing buyers and 
willing sellers would have agreed to by refraining from identifying and 
delineating the circumstances that make the market diverse.213  Furthermore, 
since the CARP and the CRB each set their industry-wide rates solely with 
reference to marketplace (“benchmark”) agreements between copyright owners 
and larger webcasters, any shortcomings in the application of the willing 
buyer/willing seller standard have no doubt been borne primarily by small and 
noncommercial webcasters, whose unique circumstances essentially were 
 
Such rates and terms shall distinguish among the different types of eligible 
nonsubscription transmission services then in operation and shall include a minimum fee 
for each type of service, such differences to be based on criteria including, but not limited 
to, the quantity and nature of the use of the sound recordings and the degree to which use 
of the service may substitute for or may promote the purchase of phonorecords by 
consumers. 
(emphasis added). 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id.  If the criteria on which the CRB can distinguish webcasters are truly unlimited, 
would not a public policy interest in protecting small and noncommercial webcasters be a 
sufficient ground on which to make a distinction for purposes of setting a different rate? 
 211. For example: means of broadcasting, income, type of programming, average number of 
listeners, number of channels/streams, average number of hours broadcast, available resources, 
business structure, profitability, demographic of target audience, availability of advertising, 
business growth projections/aspirations, etc. 
 212. See CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,087 (“In the hypothetical marketplace we 
attempt to replicate, there would be significant variations, among both buyers and sellers, in terms 
of sophistication, economic resources, business exigencies, and myriad other factors.”); see also 
CARP Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,240, 45,244 (July 8, 2002) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 261) 
(“Because of the diversity among the buyers and the sellers . . . one would expect ‘a range of 
negotiated rates’ . . . .”). 
 213. Instead, the CRB appears to have placed the burden on the parties to make distinctions 
between types of webcasters.  CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,089 n.9 (explaining that it 
will not distinguish between small and large commercial webcasters because the parties did not 
provide sufficient evidence on which to base such a distinction). 
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unaccounted for.214  Such interpretation and application of the willing 
buyer/willing seller standard seems pointedly unfair. 
Another criticism is that, in applying the willing buyer/willing seller 
standard, the CARP and CRB both assume the presence of a functioning 
marketplace with reliable benchmarks from which fair rates for all participants 
can be drawn.215  One commentator has argued that the existence of the 
statutory licensing scheme itself “distorts the very market that it seeks to 
replicate.”216  Similarly, another critic has called it “circular” to employ a 
licensing scheme to set rates that would have been set in the absence of a 
licensing scheme.217  The reality of the marketplace is that SoundExchange, on 
behalf of the recording industry, can presently negotiate an industry-wide 
royalty rate with full knowledge that, if negotiations with webcasters fall 
through, a safety net of default rates (and so far, favorable rates) is the worst it 
can do.  This safety net is what arguably distorts the marketplace and prevents 
its normal functioning by providing SoundExchange with the disincentive to 
meaningfully negotiate with webcasters.218  Without a properly functioning 
marketplace, the hypothetical marketplace of the willing buyer/willing seller 
standard has no reference point.  In other words, if the CRB’s goal is to 
ascertain and set royalty rates at the “true value” of the underlying sound-
recording right (assuming such a value can be determined), its current 
approach to determining that “true value” is flawed by reference to a third 
party’s “perceived value” of the underlying right, which is likely skewed by 
self-interest.219 
By far the most suggested solution to these criticisms of the willing 
buyer/willing seller standard and its application is reversion back to the § 
801(b)(1) policy guidelines.  This move would better promote traditional 
 
 214. See CARP Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. at 45,245 (adopting the Yahoo!/RIAA 
agreement as its benchmark); CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,092 (adopting Dr. Pelcovits’ 
interactive webcasting market as its benchmark); Testimony of Michael Pelcovits, In re Digital 
Performing Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No. 2005-1 CRB 
DTRA, at 11–12 (Copyright Royalty Bd. Oct. 2005) (referring only to agreements between 
“major copyright owners” and major record label[s]). 
 215. See Fessler, supra note 200, at 418. 
 216. Id. at 421 (“The standard permits CARP to turn to marketplace agreements in fabricating 
its hypothetical willing buyer and seller, when these agreements themselves are the product of 
influences that would not exist absent the CARP, therefore not reflecting agreements that would 
have been reached in a normal, free-flowing marketplace.”); see also id. at 400. 
 217. Jackson, supra note 60, at 476. 
 218. Fessler, supra note 200, at 419.  But cf. CARP Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,240, 
45,245 (July 8, 2002) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 261)(explaining that the CARP found in its 2002 
proceeding that the “RIAA’s perceived market power was tempered by the existence of the 
statutory license, which, for purposes of negotiating a fair rate for use of sound recordings, 
leveled the playing field.”). 
 219. Jackson, supra note 60, at 476. 
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copyright goals by allowing for a more equitable balancing of the competing 
interests of copyright owners, copyright users, and the public.220  The current 
balance of these interests under the willing buyer/willing seller standard seems 
tipped disproportionately in favor of copyright owners, with little regard for 
the interests of copyright users and little assurance that the balance actually 
benefits the public in any way. 
A second suggested solution, broader in scope, is to replace the current 
system with a tiered royalty rate scheme that would account for differing types 
of webcasters.221  Such a standard might separate webcasters into categories 
with assigned royalty rates that would increase as the webcaster’s listening-
base increased (similar to an ATH payment option)222 or perhaps as the 
webcaster’s revenue increased.223  Such a scheme might allow small and 
noncommercial webcasters to negotiate separate royalty rates with the 
recording industry, which in effect would allow the market to determine the 
tiers through voluntary party negotiation.224  On the other hand, Congress 
could determine the tiers by passing legislation that sets separate rates for 
different categories of webcasters.225  This type of tiered scheme would require 
Congress to statutorily identify and define the different categories of 
webcasters—a task neither it, the CRB, nor the parties to the rate 
determinations have yet to accomplish.226 
2. Removing Bias from the Royalty Determinations 
A second problem with the current royalty rate-determination process is 
that it is biased against Internet radio solely on the basis of technology.227  
When it created the digital performance right for sound recordings in 1995, 
Congress expressly exempted terrestrial radio from paying sound recording 
royalties because of the promotional value radio has traditionally provided 
record companies.228  Conversely, all forms of non-terrestrial radio (e.g. 
Internet radio and satellite radio) have been subject to such royalties for at least 
 
 220. Fessler, supra note 200, at 400–401, 411 n.82; Jackson, supra note 60, at 478; Delibero, 
supra note 91, at 112. 
 221. Kidd, supra note 26, at 367; CASTRO, supra note 20, at 10. 
 222. Kidd, supra note 26, at 367. 
 223. Delibero, supra note 91, at 110–11. 
 224. CASTRO, supra note 20, at 10. 
 225. Kidd, supra note 26, at 373–74. 
 226. See CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,089 n.9 (May 1, 2007) (codified at 37 
C.F.R. pt. 380) (“Indeed, since none of the small commercial webcasters participating in this 
proceeding provided helpful evidence about what demarcates a ‘small’ webcaster from other 
webcasters at any given point in time.”). 
 227. CASTRO, supra note 20, at 1. 
 228. Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 488 (3rd Cir. 2003); 17 U.S.C. § 
114(d)(1)(A) (1995). 
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a decade.  Moreover, the actual amount of the sound recording royalties paid 
by Internet radio greatly exceeds the amount typically paid by other radio 
services that make similar digital transmissions.  As a result, some 
commentators have labeled the current rate structure as “technology-biased” in 
favor of non-Internet radio services, especially in favor of terrestrial radio.229 
Several proposed solutions aim to eliminate this type of discrimination.  
One commentator believes that if “promotional value” continues to be the 
reason terrestrial radio is exempted from paying sound recording royalties, 
Internet radio should also be exempted since it “provides far greater promotion 
for aspiring musicians because of its greater geographic reach, as compared to 
over the air radio.”230  A second commentator believes that terrestrial radio’s 
original exemption was “solely a [sic] historical accident and the result of 
tremendous lobbying power.”231  As such, she believes that Congress should 
make terrestrial radio subject to the same royalties as Internet and satellite 
radio.232  Moreover, she has suggested that terrestrial stations pay three percent 
of their gross revenue as the royalty fee, 100 percent of which would go 
directly to artists (as opposed to the fifty-fifty split between record companies 
and artists under the current § 114).233  Finally, a third commentator has 
proposed that Congress take an “all-or-nothing approach” to the issue, which 
entails either exempting all forms of radio from the payment of sound 
recording royalties or subjecting all forms of radio to the same rate, regardless 
of the medium used to transmit the recordings.234  Without the universal 
application of royalties to all forms of radio, it is argued that exempt stations 
will have a competitive advantage over non-exempt stations and that copyright 
owners will be unfairly compensated as a result.235  Therefore, it is suggested 
that Congress “promote technology-neutral policies to ensure a fair and 
competitive market for all forms of radio.”236 
Moreover, Internet and satellite royalties for the same performance right 
are calculated under different standards.  Royalties for the former are 
calculated under the willing buyer/willing seller standard, while royalties for 
 
 229. See generally Anthony L. Soudatt & Natalie Sulimani, Net Radio Royalty Rates, 
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 4, 2008, 2–4, 10–11, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nylj/PubArticleNY.jsp? 
id=1201864417399; CASTRO, supra note 20, at 8. 
 230. Soudatt & Sulimani, supra note 229, at 10. 
 231. Gigi B. Sohn, Presentation to the New Media and the Market place of Ideas Conference, 
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a Pre-VCR law for a YouTube World (Oct. 26, 2007), http://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/ 
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 232. Id. 
 233. Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 114(g)(2) (2000). 
 234. CASTRO, supra note 20, at 9. 
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the latter are calculated under the policy objectives of § 801(b)(1).237  Under 
the willing buyer/willing seller standard, the CRB determined that commercial 
webcasters should pay under a per-performance metric from 2006 to 2010, 
with no alternative payment option; but under the § 801(b)(1) standard, the 
CRB more recently determined that satellite radio stations should pay six 
percent to eight percent of their gross revenue from 2007 to 2012 for use of the 
same royalties.238  The main reason satellite radio’s rate structure is more 
forgiving appears to be the different standards.239  One commentator has 
pointed out that the main difference in § 801’s policy-based standard (when 
compared to the willing buyer/willing seller standard) is the explicit element of 
“fairness.”240  Thus, to completely address the discrimination issue, Congress 
not only must equally apply exempt or non-exempt status to all forms of radio, 
but it must ensure that the royalties these stations pay (under a non-exempt 
scenario) are determined under the same standard. 
In fact, terrestrial radio’s exemption from the payment of digital 
performance royalties for sound recordings may be short-lived.  On December 
18, 2007, the Performance Rights Act was introduced to the House of 
Representatives to “provide parity in radio performing rights.”241  This Act is 
addressed more completely in Part V.B.2 below. 
In sum, the current rate-determination process is plagued by two 
fundamental problems.  The first is the standard by which webcaster royalties 
are determined.  The second involves discrimination against Internet radio 
solely on the basis of technology.  Any long-term solution to the Internet radio 
controversy should address both of these issues. 
V.  SURVIVAL OPTIONS FOR WEBCASTERS 
Webcasters have responded in a number of ways to the CRB’s new royalty 
scheme.  On March 20, 2007, webcasters filed various motions for rehearing, 
reconsideration, and clarification of the CRB’s March 2, 2007 initial 
determination.  The CRB denied all such motions on April 16, 2007, 
explaining that the issues and arguments raised by the webcasters had either 
been addressed in its initial determination or were not significant enough to 
 
 237. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(1)(B) (2000) with § 114(f)(2)(B) and § 801(b)(1). 
 238. Kurt Hanson, CRB Sets Royalty Rate for Satellite Radio: 6% of Revenues Now, Rising to 
8%, RAIN, Dec. 5, 2007, http://textpattern.kurthanson.com/crb/110/crb-sets-royalty-rate-for-
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 239. Id.  SoundExchange explained in a press release that “due to a federal law requiring that 
any new royalty rate avoid creating an overly ‘disruptive’ impact on the satellite services, the 
CRB reduced the royalty from the benchmark [thirteen] percent to six percent in the first two 
years of the term, with a gradual increase to [eight] percent in 2012.”  Id. 
 240. Fessler, supra note 200, at 422. 
 241. See H.R. 4789, 110th Cong. (2007) (introduced by Rep. Howard Berman); see also infra 
Part V.B.2. 
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warrant rehearing.242  Since then, webcasters have been forced to pursue other 
options, such as appeal, legislative remedies, direct negotiation with 
SoundExchange, and the possibility of relocating operations abroad.  This part 
addresses the likelihood of success of each of these options. 
A. Appeal 
One option being pursued by webcasters is appeal of the CRB’s rate 
determination to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit.243  The Court of Appeals will only deem unlawful and set 
aside agency actions, findings, and conclusions found to be (1) arbitrary and 
capricious, (2) contrary to constitutional law, (3) in excess of either statutory 
jurisdiction, authority, or limitation, (4) without observance of the requisite 
procedures, (5) unsupported by substantial evidence, or (6) unwarranted by the 
facts, but only if the facts are subject to a trial de novo.244 
Though webcasters filed their appeals in June of 2007, little progress has 
been made thus far.  Presently, the parties’ briefs are due on the following 
dates: February 25, 2008 for webcasters; April 25, 2008 for the CRB; and May 
15, 2008 for SoundExchange and for the Department of Justice, which is 
defending the CRB in the proceedings.245  Reply briefs are due on June 12, 
2008.246  Under this timeline, it is projected that oral arguments will not be 
held until autumn of 2008, with a decision coming sometime in late 2008 or 
early 2009.247 
Most recently, webcasters filed three separate briefs with the Court of 
Appeals.248  Large and small webcasters jointly filed one brief; various 
commercial broadcast groups filed a second; and several noncommercial 
broadcast groups filed a third.249  Together, webcasters’ briefs raised roughly 
 
 242. See In re Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 
Docket No. 2005-1 CRB DTRA (Copyright Royalty Bd. Apr. 16, 2007), available at 
http://www.loc.gov/crb/proceedings/2005-1/motion-denial.pdf (denying motion for rehearing). 
 243. See 17 U.S.C. § 803(d)(1) (2000) (allowing appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit within thirty days after the CRB’s opinion is published in the Federal 
Register). 
 244. 17 U.S.C. § 803(d)(3) (2000); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2000). 
 245. Soudatt & Sulimani, supra note 229, at 10; Posting by David Oxenford to Broadcast 
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royalties.  Id. 
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webcasters include AccuRadio, Radioio, Radio Paradise, and Digitally Imported Radio; 
commercial broadcast groups include Bonneville, the NAB and the National Religious 
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six issues criticizing the CRB’s 2007 rate determination.250  One criticism is 
that the CRB failed to address webcasters’ proposal that they be allowed to pay 
a flat royalty fee, similar to the one collected by performing rights 
organizations in exchange for the license to publicly performing musical 
works.251  Similarly, noncommercial stations claimed that the CRB should 
have adopted a flat fee comparable to one that had previously been negotiated 
between SoundExchange and NPR.252  A third criticism concerns the CRB’s 
determination that small commercial webcasters did not really care about 
obtaining a percentage-of-revenue rate structure “despite consistent testimony 
that the fee was necessary to their survival.”253  A fourth criticism is that the 
CRB adopted the $500 per-channel minimum fee without any evidence that the 
fee accurately reflects SoundExchange’s collection costs.254  A fifth complaint 
is that the CRB adopted SoundExchange’s “adjusted” interactive webcasting-
services benchmark despite (1) the fact that a similar benchmark had been 
proposed and abandoned by SoundExchange in a recent royalty-rate 
proceeding against satellite radio broadcasters and (2) the existence of an 
agreement between the recording industry and Yahoo! (similar to the one 
relied on by the CARP in 2002), which webcasters believe is a more analogous 
benchmark.255  Finally, webcasters argue that the CRB was not required to 
adopt a specific proposal advanced by the parties (which the CRB essentially 
did, in favor of SoundExchange); instead, webcasters argue that the Copyright 
Royalty Judges should have considered all of the relevant evidence before 
them with the ultimate goal of crafting the most appropriate royalty rate (or 
rates) overall.256 
According to attorney David Oxenford, the “principal point” raised on 
appeal by small commercial webcasters was the CRB’s failure to adopt a 
percentage-of-revenue rate structure.257  To win this argument, it appears that 
small commercial webcasters will have to show that the CRB’s rejection of 
this rate structure was either arbitrary and capricious or unsupported by 
substantial evidence.  However, after reading the CRB’s decision, it is hard to 
imagine that webcasters can meet this high burden of proof.  First, although 
small commercial webcasters may argue that expert witness testimony 
consistently demonstrated that their survival depends on a percentage-of-
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revenue rate structure, the CRB addressed the issue in detail.  It explained that 
the small commercial webcasters’ only witness conceded that, in “requiring” a 
percentage-of-revenue structure, small webcasters were ultimately worried 
about staying in business.258  Further, the CRB reasoned that, even if it decided 
to treat “small” webcasters differently, there was a problem with defining 
“small” webcasters: the Judges refused to do so in the absence of evidence 
offered by the parties.259  Moreover, the Judges found that small commercial 
webcasters had failed to provide evidence (aside from assertion) that such a 
structure was actually required for survival.260  After rejecting the percentage-
of-revenue structure, the CRB proceeded to give a number of reasons 
supporting its choice of a per-performance fee structure over a percentage-of-
revenue structure.261  Overall, the CRB’s treatment of this issue does not 
appear to be arbitrary and capricious since its reasoning is detailed and at least 
plausibly supports its conclusion.  Moreover, there seems to be enough 
evidence in the record, based on the CRB’s treatment of witness testimony, to 
support their rejection of a percentage-of-revenue structure. 
Webcasters’ other claims also are likely to run into similar problems with 
meeting the high standard of proof.  The CRB considered a sizeable amount of 
written and oral evidence from all parties involved.  It seems unlikely in the 
end that the Appellate Court will find that the Judges’ decisions on these other 
issues lack sufficient evidentiary support or are arbitrary and capricious in 
nature.  Even if the Appellate Court does find in favor of webcasters on a 
certain issue, the likely result will be a remand to the CRB to better explain or 
support its finding.  Furthermore, webcasters have a financial incentive to 
resolve these issues sooner rather than later; it would be risky to rely solely on 
the judicial process for relief when there is no guarantee of a satisfactory 
resolution.  Accordingly, webcasters have been seeking other solutions in 
addition to appeal. 
B. Proposed Legislation 
1. The Internet Radio Equality Act 
Whereas their success in the judicial arena seems unlikely, webcasters 
appear to have a much better chance of securing an effective legislative 
remedy.  Soon after the CRB’s initial decision, webcasters around the country 
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began organizing in hopes of presenting Congress with unified opposition to 
the CRB’s ruling.262  Webcasters started campaigning to raise awareness of the 
issues facing Internet radio and encouraged listeners to contact their 
Congressmen for support.263  By April 26, 2007—even before the CRB’s final 
determination came down—webcasters had found a voice in Congress.  On 
that date, Congressmen Jay Inslee, a Democrat from Washington, and Don 
Manzullo, a Republican from Illinois, introduced The Internet Radio Equality 
Act (“IREA”) to the House of Representatives.264  Shortly thereafter, a 
companion bill was introduced in the Senate by Senators Ron Wyden, a 
Democrat from Oregon,  and Sam Brownback, a Republican from Kansas.265  
The stated purpose of both bills is: “To nullify the March 2, 2007, 
determination of the Copyright Royalty Judges with respect to webcasting, to 
modify the basis for making such a determination, and for other purposes.”266 
The IREA would allow commercial webcasters to choose between paying 
seven and a half percent of their gross revenue or $0.0033 per ATH for the 
remainder of the current term (i.e., until 2010).267  Noncommercial webcasters 
would pay only one and a half times the rates they paid during 2004.268  But 
most significantly, the IREA would amend the Copyright Act by striking the 
willing buyer/willing seller standard and reinstating § 801(b)(1)’s policy-based 
standard as the guidepost for determining future royalty rates.269 
One of the questions lurking behind the IREA is whether or not Congress 
is serious about enacting it.  In hindsight, the IREA looks very similar to the 
Internet Radio Fairness Act (“IRFA”), which was proposed in 2002 by one of 
the same congressmen who introduced the IREA.270  The IRFA was ultimately 
tabled and succeeded by the SWSA, which provided only short-term relief to 
webcasters while ignoring the flawed willing buyer/willing seller standard.271  
It is unclear whether the IREA is destined for the same fate.  On one hand, 
Congress may simply be using the IREA as a blunt instrument to pressure 
SoundExchange into meaningful negotiations with webcasters.  John Simson 
of SoundExchange seems to agree.  He thinks it would “go against common 
sense” for Congress to legislatively overrule the CRB’s rates, given that 
Congress specifically created the CRB to utilize its expertise in making such 
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decisions.272  On the other hand, perhaps the controversy surrounding these 
rate determinations under the willing buyer/willing seller standard has actually 
forced Congress to reconsider the underlying problem it originally pinpointed 
in the IRFA. 
By last count, the IREA had 145 co-sponsors in the House and five in the 
Senate.273  It remains true that the introduction of a bill like the IREA is only 
the first step in the legislative process.  Such bills must make it through 
committees that deliberate, investigate, and revise them before being sent on to 
a general debate.  Most bills never make it out of committee.274 
2. The Performance Rights Act 
More recently, on December 18, 2007, the Performance Rights Act was 
introduced to the House of Representatives by Representative Howard 
Berman.275 A companion bill was introduced in the Senate by Senator Patrick 
Leahy.276  If passed, these bills would subject terrestrial radio to the same 
digital performance royalty for the transmission of sound recordings that all 
other forms of radio have been subject to since the mid-to-late 1990s.277  
Notably, the Performance Rights Act would accord separate rates for small, 
noncommercial, educational, and religious terrestrial broadcasters.278  
SoundExchange has apparently welcomed the bill, which would provide 
another source of income to its artists and record labels.279  Thus far, the 
Performance Rights Act has five co-sponsors in the House and three in the 
Senate.280 
Interestingly, an opposition resolution titled the Local Radio Freedom Act 
also has been proposed in the House.281  Its purpose is to prevent disruption of 
the mutually beneficial relationship that has existed historically between 
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terrestrial radio stations and record companies.282  Putting its weight behind 
this resolution will certainly be the National Association of Broadcasters 
(“NAB”), a traditional lobbying power.  Accordingly, the resolution already 
has 140 co-sponsors in the House.283  It should be interesting to see which 
lobby, the RIAA or the NAB, wins this battle in the end.  In the meantime, the 
fact that a bill like the Performance Rights Act has actually been proposed 
demonstrates that Congress is at least aware of the potential unfairness of 
subjecting non-terrestrial radio stations to performance royalties simply 
because their broadcast media differs from that employed by terrestrial radio 
stations. 
C. Direct Negotiation with SoundExchange 
For the moment, the most immediate (and provisional) solution for 
webcasters is direct negotiation with SoundExchange, which has remained at 
the table under pressure from Congress.  For instance, SoundExchange and the 
Digital Media Association (“DiMA”), which represents large commercial 
webcasters, reached a settlement agreement on August 23, 2007 regarding the 
CRB’s new minimum fee requirement.284  Recall that the CRB’s rates require 
all webcasters to pay a minimum annual fee of $500 per station or channel in 
addition to higher rates.  This minimum fee itself could drive webcasters with 
numerous channels or stations out of business (e.g., Pandora, which creates 
unique stations for each individual listener).285  Under this settlement 
agreement, SoundExchange agreed to cap the per-channel minimum fee at 
$50,000 per service.286  DiMA called this agreement an “important first step” 
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in negotiations, implying that it still hopes to coax some kind of concession 
from SoundExchange regarding the CRB’s per-performance rates.287 
Regarding smaller webcasters, SoundExchange has offered to extend some 
of the terms of 2002’s SWSA for the remainder of this licensing period.288  
This offer came only after members of Congress directly asked 
SoundExchange to negotiate in good faith with smaller webcasters.289  Under 
the proposal, small webcasters would pay fees of ten percent of all gross 
revenue up to $250,000, and twelve percent for all gross revenue above that 
amount.  However, there is a catch: to qualify for the offer, webcasters first 
must meet revenue and usage cap requirements.  Only webcasters who make 
less than $1.25 million and broadcast less than five million tuning hours are 
eligible to accept the offer.290 
Many small webcasters were insulted by this offer from SoundExchange, 
particularly by the revenue and usage caps.  One criticism of this offer is that 
the caps “do not permit small webcasters to grow their businesses—artificially 
condemning them to be forever small, at best minimally profitable operations, 
in essence little more than hobbies.”291  Jake Ward of SaveNetRadio agrees, 
adding that SoundExchange’s proposal would turn Internet radio into “a lousy 
long-term business.”292  Another shortcoming of SoundExchange’s offer is that 
it does not allow webcasters to play all recorded music for their ten to twelve 
percent revenue payments (as did the terms of the SWSA).293  Instead, 
SoundExchange’s reduced rate applies only to music produced by 
SoundExchange artists.  Thus, playing music from non-SoundExchange artists 
would require payment at CRB rates.294  Finally, and maybe most importantly, 
SoundExchange’s offer is only good through 2010, when payments will again 
revert to CRB default rates.295 
SoundExchange’s offer has had mixed success.  As of September 18, 2007, 
twenty-four small webcasters had accepted the proposal and signed individual 
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agreements with SoundExchange.296  On the other hand, many small 
webcasters have rejected the proposal outright as “unrealistic and 
unacceptable.”297  Overall, while direct negotiation with SoundExchange—at 
least under its latest proposal—may offer some immediate relief for qualified 
small webcasters, it does not provide a long-term solution to the royalty rate 
controversy. 
D. Relocating Operations Abroad 
Some webcasters, as an alternative to dealing with SoundExchange or 
pursuing judicial and legislative remedies, have considered relocating their 
webcasting operations outside the United States to avoid the CRB’s new 
rates.298  However, as attorney David Oxenford points out, this would not be a 
viable option for webcasters who plan to continue streaming music to U.S. 
listeners; CRB royalties still apply to such streams.299  In fact, U.S. copyright 
law extends to all incoming foreign radio streams, which is why many foreign 
webcasters have purposely stopped streaming to U.S. residents after the CRB 
reached its decision in 2007.300  Only if a webcaster is willing to leave the U.S. 
market behind is relocating abroad a viable option.  However, moving beyond 
the reach of the CRB and U.S. copyright laws does not mean that a webcaster 
will be free from royalty obligations to foreign performing rights 
organizations.301  The only hope is that these rates might be more affordable 
than those imposed by the CRB. 
E. Conclusion 
Together, the IREA and the Performance Rights Act offer the best long-
term solution for webcasters.  Passage of the IREA would replace the willing 
buyer/willing seller standard with policy objectives that would better promote 
traditional notions of copyright law.  Passage of the Performance Rights Act 
would begin to address the current system’s technological bias against Internet 
radio by leveling the digital performance playing field.  However, it remains to 
be seen whether Congress is willing to amend copyright law again and 
legislatively overrule the CRB’s new rates, or whether it is just entertaining the 
idea to appease webcasters and pressure SoundExchange into meaningful 
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negotiation.  Further, it is uncertain how Congress will react to the clashing 
RIAA and NAB lobbies concerning imposition of performance royalties on the 
traditionally exempt terrestrial radio industry. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Congress has a second chance to repair a determination process that has 
caused an ongoing royalty war between the Internet radio and recording 
industries.  Part of the problem is the willing buyer/willing seller standard, 
which has twice failed to produce fair and competitive royalty rates and has 
twice threatened to drive small and noncommercial webcasters out of business 
despite strong public policy reasons for protecting these businesses.  Another 
part of the problem is that the current system is technology-biased against 
Internet radio, holding it to higher standards than terrestrial and satellite radio 
when the only difference between the parties’ uses of sound recordings is the 
medium by which recordings are transmitted.  A long-term solution to this 
ongoing controversy will address both the faulty standard and the historically 
disparate treatment of radio media with regard to sound recording performance 
royalties.  Attempts to address both issues are presently before Congress in the 
form of the Internet Radio Equality Act and the Performance Rights Act, 
respectively.  If these bills are passed, Congress will have taken a large step 
toward creating a sound recording royalty scheme that simultaneously 
promotes innovation and growth in the Internet radio industry and that fairly 
compensates performing artists and sound recording owners for creating music 
and sharing it with the world. 
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